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ABSTRACT 
 
The Liancourt Rocks dispute is one of a series of ongoing island disputes in 
East Asia. The dispute centres on two tiny rocks in the Sea of Japan that have 
been disputed between Japan and South Korea for centuries. Despite its long 
history, the dispute has not received much Western attention and has never 
been resolved.  
 
This paper considers several aspects of the issue including the law of 
sovereignty and its application to this problem, the ability of North Korea to 
claim the Rocks as a successor of the Kingdom of Korea, the potential for the 
Rocks to generate extended maritime zones under the law of the sea and the 
possibility of using a condominium to share the resources of the region. In 
doing so, this paper seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of the dispute 
and provide practical proposals for its resolution.  
 
This paper seeks to answer the question of how this dispute would be resolved 
at law. It is argued that South Korea would prevail over both Japan and North 
Korea, but that this would not generate the extended maritime zones 
envisaged by the parties. However, even utilising unconventional solutions 
like condominiums would not resolve the underlying problem which is 
ultimately a matter of national pride.   
 v 
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 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In the middle of the Sea of Japan are two tiny rocks at the centre of an ancient 
and ongoing dispute between Japan and South Korea. These Rocks have had 
various names over the centuries, including Matsushima and Takeshima in 
Japanese1 or Seokdo, Dokdo and Tokdo in Korean.2 For the purposes of 
neutrality, this paper will use the Western name of “Liancourt Rocks”. The 
dispute over the Liancourt Rocks dates back to 512AD and has been 
complicated by war, colonisation, state succession and developments in 
international law. The insistence of sovereignty over these tiny rocks for so 
many centuries is somewhat surprising. The Rocks are volcanic, surrounded 
by sharp cliffs, with scarce vegetation and no drinking water.3 They cannot 
sustain permanent human habitation. However the Rocks are surrounded by 
rich fishing waters and, potentially, hydrocarbons.4 More importantly, the 
Liancourt Rocks are tied to Japanese-Korean history and nationhood. 
 
This dispute is one of many throughout Asia. Western literature has focused 
on the better known examples such as the Paracel Islands, disputed by China, 
Taiwan and Vietnam, the Senkaku Islands, claimed by Japan, China and 
Taiwan, or the best known Spratly Islands which are the centre of a dispute 
between Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. These 
disputes have sometimes escalated into conflict and have the potential to be 
the next flashpoint for war.5  
 
                                                
1 Hideki Kajimura, ‘The Question of Takeshima/Tokdo’ (1997) 28(3) Korea Observer 423, 
437.  
2 See, eg, Sung-jae Choi, ‘The Politics of the Dokdo Issue’ (2005) 5 Journal of East Asian 
Studies 465, 467; Choung Il Chee, Legal Status of Dok Island in International Law (Korean 
Association of International Law, 1997) 6-7.  
3 Kajimura, above n 1, 434.  
4 Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, ‘Sovereignty Claims Over the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima)’ 
(2010) 28 Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 78, 78; Jon M Van 
Dyke, ‘Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary’ (2007) 
38 Ocean Development and International Law 157, 198; ‘Profile: Dokdo/Takeshima Islands’, 
BBC News Asia (Online), 10 August 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
19207086>. Cf Thomas J Schoenbaum, ‘Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes 
with its Neighbors – Problems and Opportunities’ (2006) 57 The Journal of Social Science 
197, 204; Oxford Public International Law, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (at June 2007), Masahiko Asada, ‘Takeshima/Dok Do Island’ [1]. 
5 See Schoenbaum, above n 4, 197. 
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Although it is part of a wider problem, the Liancourt Rocks dispute has its 
own unique aspects. This paper seeks to answer the question of how this 
dispute would be resolved at law. It is argued that South Korea would prevail 
over both Japan and North Korea, but that this would not generate the 
extended maritime zones envisaged by the parties. However, even utilising 
unconventional solutions like condominiums would not resolve the underlying 
problem which is ultimately a matter of national pride.  Chapters II and III 
will consider the first of these issues: the law of territorial acquisition and its 
application to Japan and South Korea’s claims. Despite the dispute’s long 
history it is the recent past which proves critical. Chapter IV will assess the 
role of North Korea, an oft forgotten claimant, concluding that North Korea’s 
failure to assert a claim since becoming a State has precluded it from gaining 
sovereignty now. Chapter V will then consider the issue of maritime 
boundaries. Islands may generate extended maritime zones that significantly 
increase State sovereignty. In practicality, control of marine resources is what 
makes the Rocks valuable but this value is decreased because the Liancourt 
Rocks are not entitled to the full zones. Finally Chapter VI will consider a 
middle ground approach, that of condominium, to allow both States to share 
the resources surrounding the Rocks. Although this could be a practical 
solution, it would not resolve the underlying problems left by the legacy of the 
Second World War.  
 
In writing these chapters I have often relied on the works of scholars who 
have reviewed, and often reproduced, those primary documents I could not 
obtain access to. Many sources are still not available outside the National 
Archives of Japan and Korea, and some of the wartime documents are still 
classified.6 Therefore it is possible that, if this dispute were ever to go before 
an international tribunal, new evidence could be adduced which would change 
the outcome.  
 
                                                
6 See, eg, Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San 
Francisco System (Routledge, 2007) 32. 
 3 
Ultimately, the many facets of this dispute can be resolved through 
international law but this will not resolve the core problems. These problems 
stem from the legacy of the Second World War and Japanese colonisation of 
Korea. In order to effectively end the dispute itself, the parties must come to 
terms with their past. At its core, the Liancourt Rocks dispute is not a dispute 
about sovereignty or resources. It is about Japanese acknowledgment of 
Korean nationhood and about making amends for past sins.  
 4 
II LAW OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A Title to Territory 
 
Historically, territory was considered the personal property of the sovereign.7 
In international law there are five traditional modes of territorial acquisition, 
which have derived from private Roman law. 8  These are: occupation, 
accretion, cession, subjugation and prescription.9 Occupation and accretion 
both involve acquiring title for the first time, while cession, subjugation and 
prescription involve acquiring title that once belonged to another State. On 
this basis the five modes are divided into two categories: original and 
derivative title.10 There are also five corresponding ways of losing territory: 
cession, abandonment 11  (which corresponds to occupation), nature, 
subjugation and prescription.12 There is also a sixth mode of loss, revolt.13    
 
In modern law the focus has shifted to the acquisition of sovereignty over 
territory by the State, rather than personal ownership by the monarch.14 Other 
developments in international law like self-determination and the prohibition 
                                                
7 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Longman, 
9th ed, 1992) vol 1B, 679. 
8 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 679; James Crawford (ed), 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2012 ) 
220; Randall Lessaffer, ‘Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: 
Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 
25, 39. 
9 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 220; Watts and Jennings (eds), above n 7, 
679-80, 686-8, 696, 698-9, 705-6, 708; Benjamin K Sibbett, ‘Tokdo or Takeshima? The 
Territorial Dispute Between Japan and the Republic of Korea’ (1998) 21 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1606, 1622; Phil Haas, ‘Status and Sovereignty of the Liancourt 
Rocks: The Dispute between Japan and Korea’ (2012) 15 Gonzaga Journal of International 
Law 2, 5; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 158; Schoenbaum, above n 4, 
207-8; Seokwoo Lee, ‘Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition 
in International Law and a Modest Proposal’ (2000) 16 Connecticut Journal of International 
Law 1, 1. 
10 However there is a difference of opinion about whether subjugation and prescription are 
derivative titles. Some scholars like Oppenheim define derivative title as title bestowed by the 
former sovereign. In this circumstance prescription and subjugation are considered original 
titles because they are acquired by the claiming State itself. See Jennings and Watts (eds), 
Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 679. 
11 This is sometimes separated into two types, renunciation and abandonment or dereliction: 
Seokwoo Lee, ‘Intertemporal Law, Recent Judgments and Territorial Disputes in Asia’ in 
Seong-Yong Hong and Jon M Van Dyke (eds), Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement 
Processes, and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 119, 123. 
12 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 716.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid 679.  
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of the use of force have also displaced some aspects of traditional title.15 In 
particular, tribunals have focused on effective occupation as the key feature of 
sovereignty. As a result, the five modes have been widely criticised as being 
obsolete and obscuring factual analysis.16 However modern law has developed 
from these modes and many ancient titles are based upon these doctrines. 
Japan and South Korea can potentially base their claims to the Liancourt 
Rocks on all modes except accretion, the formation of territory by natural 
means. 17  Therefore understanding the other four modes is important to 
understand the dispute.  
 
1 Original Title 
(a) Discovery 
 
Two old forms of title are immemorial possession and discovery. Today, 
neither is accepted as a sole basis for title. Immemorial possession18 relies on 
historical fact and general opinion.19 Tribunals recognise this ancient title, but 
require supporting evidence.20 Discovery is linked to the concept of terra 
nullius, which is now out-dated because there is little unclaimed land left in 
the world.21 Before the 18th century, discovery was considered sufficient to 
acquire sovereignty over territory.22 However today it is widely accepted that 
discovery only afford an inchoate title.23 An inchoate title may bar other 
                                                
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 221; Lee, ‘Continuing Relevance of 
Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above n 9, 1. 
17 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 696.  
18 Also known as possession since time immemorial. 
19 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 221.  
20 Ibid. See Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, 42-3 (‘Western Sahara’); 
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua 
intervening) (Judgment) [1992] ICJ Rep 351, 564-5 (‘El Salvador v Honduras)’); Indo-
Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) Case (India v Pakistan) (1968) 50 ILR 2, 474-5 
(‘Rann of Kutch’); Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea v Yemen) 
(Award in the First Phase) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 9 October 1998), 35-45 
(‘Eritrea-Yemen’). 
21 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 223; Haas, above n 9, 5; Malcolm Shaw, 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2008) 284. The Court also prefers title 
to terra nullius: Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 217.  
22 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 689.  
23 Ibid 690; Island of Palmas (Netherlands v United States) (Award) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 829 
(‘Island of Palmas’); Sovereignty over Clipperton Island (France v Mexico) (Award) (1932) 
26 American Journal of International Law 390, 393 (‘Clipperton Island’); Crawford (ed), 
Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 223. 
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States from occupying the territory24 but it must be completed by the claimant 
State through effective occupation within a reasonable period of time.25 
 
(b) Effective Occupation 
 
Effective occupation is key to territorial acquisition. It has its roots in the 
seminal decision of Island of Palmas, 26  a 1928 arbitration between the 
Netherlands and USA before Max Huber. The case involved a sovereignty 
dispute over Palmas Island. The US argued that Palmas, by virtue of the 
principle of contiguity, had belonged to the Philippines, which in turn had 
been Spanish territory.27 Spain had ceded the Philippines to the US in the 
Treaty of Paris. The Netherlands disputed this and argued that Palmas had 
been colonised on their behalf by the Dutch East India Company. This was 
followed by a period of uninterrupted and peaceful sovereignty over the 
island, as the Dutch established their control through treaties with the native 
chiefs.28    
 
Huber rejected the USA’s arguments and awarded sovereignty to the 
Netherlands.29 He held that discovery only created an inchoate title that must 
be completed by effective occupation.30 Importantly, Huber considered that a 
continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty was as good as a title.31 He did 
not define what this required, but accepted that manifestations of territorial 
sovereignty could and would take different forms depending on the territory.32 
He also accepted that it could not be exercised ‘at every moment on every 
point of a territory’33 and held that the display of sovereignty could be a slow 
evolution.34 He concluded that ‘the actual continuous and peaceful display of 
                                                
24 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 829; Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, 
above n 7, 690. 
25 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 846.  
26 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829. 
27 Ibid 837.  
28 Ibid 837-8. See also Sibbett, above n 9, 1625-6; Haas, above n 9, 6. 
29 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 871. 
30 Ibid 846. See also Sibbett, above n 9, 1627. 
31 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 839.  
32 Ibid 840. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid 867. 
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State functions is in case of dispute the sound and natural criterium of 
territorial sovereignty.’35   
 
Effective occupation has been the key to sovereignty ever since and 
subsequent cases have built upon Huber’s dictum. The next key decision was 
the 1932 arbitration Clipperton Island36 between France and Mexico. The 
arbitrator, Victor Emmanuel III, expanded upon the requirements for 
occupation stating that taking possession consisted of the ‘act, or series of 
acts, by which the occupying State reduces to its possession the territory in 
question and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there.’37 He upheld 
Huber’s finding that the exercise of sovereignty depended upon the 
characteristics of the territory.38 Usually possession occurred when the State 
established an organisation capable of making laws respected in the 
territory. 39  However where territory was uninhabited, he believed that 
occupation was completed the moment the occupying State made its first 
appearance on the territory.40  
 
The Permanent Court of International Justice (‘PCIJ’) decided upon the Legal 
Status of Eastern Greenland41 just a year later in 1933. The dispute was 
between Norway and Denmark over the sovereignty of Eastern Greenland. 
Rather than relying on a traditional mode of acquisition, Denmark based its 
claim upon a ‘peaceful and continuous display of State sovereignty.’42 The 
PCIJ expanded upon the doctrine of effective occupation by imposing both a 
physical and mental element. The State must both intend to act as sovereign 
and actually exercise sovereign authority.43 The Court noted that very little 
                                                
35 Ibid 840. 
36 Clipperton Island  (1932) 26 American Journal of International Law 390. 
37 Ibid 393.  
38 Ibid 393-4. 
39 Ibid 394.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) (Judgment) [1933] PCIJ (ser A/B) 
No 53 (‘Eastern Greenland’).  
42 Ibid 27.  
43 Ibid 28; See also Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in 
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 659, 712 
(‘Caribbean Sea’); Western Sahara [1975] ICJ Rep 12, 43; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan 
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evidence of actual exercise of authority is required (particularly in unsettled 
areas) provided no other State is able to establish a superior claim.44 
 
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) first considered territorial 
sovereignty in 1953 in Minquiers and Ecrehos.45 France and the United 
Kingdom both claimed original title to the islands of Minquiers and Ecrehos: 
the UK by conquest and treaty confirmation and France by alleging that the 
English Kings held the islands in fee for French Kings.46 The dispute had a 
long history dating back to the Middle Ages but the Court did not consider 
that either party was able to definitively prove original title. Instead the Court 
focused on recent history stating ‘[w]hat is of decisive importance, in the 
opinion of the Court, is not indirect presumptions deduced from events in the 
Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the possession of the 
Ecrehos and Minquiers group.’47 The Court therefore focused on recent 
effective occupation, rather than traditional title.  
 
The ICJ adheres to Huber’s dictum that effectiveness depends upon the 
circumstances.48 Although it has never defined effectiveness, it has set down 
criteria. First, an act must be an exercise of jurisdiction over the disputed 
territory.49  It must be carried out by the State itself 50 or by authorised 
                                                                                                                          
and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v Malaysia) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 682 (‘Ligitan and 
Sipadan’); Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 226.  
44 Eastern Greenland [1933] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 53, 28.  
45 Minquiers and Ecrehos  (France v United Kingdom) (Judgment) [1953] ICJ Rep 47 
(‘Minquiers and Ecrehos’).  
46 Ibid 53. See also Sibbett, above n 9, 1630. 
47 Minquiers and Ecrehos [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 57. See also Jon M Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over 
Islands and Maritime Boundaries in East Asia’ in Seong-Yong Hong and Jon M Van Dyke 
(eds), Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 39, 47; Kentaro Serita, ‘Some Legal Aspects of Territorial Disputes 
over Islands’ in Seong-Yong Hong and Jon M Van Dyke (eds), Maritime Boundary Disputes, 
Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 137, 142; 
El Salvador v Honduras [1992] ICJ Rep 351, 565; Eritrea-Yemen (Phase 1) (Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, 9 October 1998) 126. 
48 Eastern Greenland [1933] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 53, 45-6; Ligitan and Sipadan  [2002] ICJ 
Rep 625, 682, 685; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 40, 99-100 (‘Qatar and Bahrain’); Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v Singapore) 
(Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 36-7 (‘Pedra Branca’); Clipperton Island  (1932) 26 
American Journal of International Law 390, 393-4.  
49 Ligitan and Sipadan  [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 682-3; Caribbean Sea [2007] ICJ Rep 659, 713. 
50 See, eg, Minquiers and Ecrehos [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 65, 69. 
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individuals.51 Private acts to appropriate territory may also be ratified by the 
State.52 The PCIJ stated in Eastern Greenland that ‘legislation is one of the 
most obvious forms of sovereign power.’53 It is one of three types of evidence 
that the ICJ identified in Minquiers and Ecrehos along with jurisdiction and 
local administration.54 Of these categories, the ICJ was satisfied that the UK 
exercised powers of legislation, criminal jurisdiction, taxation and 
administration through the grant of fishing licenses over Minquiers and 
Ecrehos.55 In ambiguous cases, the ICJ relies on less fundamental matters.56 
The Court will also consider competing claims and weigh titles against each 
other.57 Even a less than perfect title holds out against those with weaker 
claims. There is no need to notify other States to validate the occupation.58    
  
These principles were clearly demonstrated in Ligitan and Sipadan, 59  a 
dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over the islands of Ligitan and 
Sipadan. The islands were historically uninhabited, although both had 
lighthouses.60 Malaysia later developed Sipadan into a tourist resort.61 The ICJ 
first considered arguments regarding historical title, but concluded that these 
did not establish sovereignty.62 The Court then turned to evidence of effective 
occupation and stated that this should be considered even if it did not co-exist 
                                                
51 Ligitan and Sipadan  [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 683; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v 
Namibia) (Judgment) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045, 1105 (‘Kasikili/Sedudu’). 
52 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 226; Qatar and Bahrain [2001] ICJ Rep 
40, 100; Ligitan and Sipadan [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 683.  
53 Eastern Greenland [1933] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 53, 48.  
54 Minquiers and Ecrehos [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 64-5; Young-Min Youn, Sung-Ho Park and 
Yun-Cheol Lee, ‘A Critical Survey of the Channel Islands Dispute between the UK and 
France: A Comparative Study of the Minquiers-Ecrehos Case and the Dokdo Problem’ (2009) 
located at < www.kimlaw.or.kr/modules/board/download.php?seq=1925>, 168.  
55 Minquiers and Ecrehos [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 64-5. See also Lee, ‘Continuing Relevance of 
Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above n 9, 7. 
56 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 217. 
57 Eastern Greenland [1933] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 53, 45-6; Western Sahara [1975] ICJ Rep 12, 
43, 49; Caribbean Sea [2007] ICJ Rep 659, 712; Ligitan and Sipadan  [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 
682; Qatar and Bahrain [2001] ICJ Rep 40, 100; Pedra Branca [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 32; 
Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 691; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s 
Principles, above n 8, 223. 
58 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 688. 
59 Ligitan and Sipadan  [2002] ICJ Rep 625. 
60 Ibid 634, 681. See generally, Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over Islands’, above n 47, 48.  
61 Ligitan and Sipadan  [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 634.  
62 Ibid 655-6, 661, 665, 668-9, 676, 678.  
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with title.63 The level of effectiveness required was lower because the islands 
were thinly populated.64 The Court found it significant that Indonesia had 
never protested Malaysia’s construction of lighthouses on the islands and that 
the islands were not included on Indonesian maps.65 Therefore, on the basis of 
effective occupation, the islands were awarded to Malaysia.66  
 
2 Derivative Title 
(a) Prescription 
 
A State may lose title as a result of effective occupation by another State, 
known as prescription. Prescription is defined as the acquisition of 
sovereignty over territory through the exercise of continuous and undisturbed 
sovereignty for sufficient time to establish to the international community that 
sovereignty has been acquired.67 The requirements for prescription are similar 
to effective occupation. First, the new claimant must possess the territory on 
the basis of sovereignty.68 Possession must be public, peaceful, uninterrupted 
and persistent.69 Adverse possession is key70 but there are no rules regarding 
the necessary length of time or circumstances. 71  The critical factor is 
acquiescence by the sovereign State.72 If other States protest and maintain 
competing claims to the territory, then possession cannot be undisturbed.73  
                                                
63 Ibid 678. See also Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 554, 
586-7 (‘Burkina Faso v Mali’); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 
303, 353 (‘Cameroon v Nigeria’).  
64 Ligitan and Sipadan [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 682.  
65 Ibid 665-8, 685-6. 
66 Ibid 686. 
67 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 706. See also Sibbett, above n 9, 
1624; Haas, above n 9; Shaw, International Law, above n 21, 284; Lee, ‘Continuing 
Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above n 9, 12-3. 
68 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 231; Kasikili/Sedudu [1999] ICJ Rep 
1045, 1103-4; Pedra Branca [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 122 (Judges Simma and Abraham). 
69 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 231; Kasikili/Sedudu [1999] ICJ Rep 
1045, 1103-4; Pedra Branca [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 122 (Judges Simma and Abraham). 
70 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 231.  
71 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 706.  This is in contrast to private 
law. For example in Western Australia, title through adverse possession can be acquired after 
12 years. 
72 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 232; Lee, ‘Continuing Relevance of 
Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above n 9, 13. 
73 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 706-7; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty 
over Dokdo’, above n 4, 185-9; Chamizal Arbitration (Mexico v USA) (Award) (1911) 11 
RIAA 309, 328. See also Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) (Merits) [1962] ICJ 
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As a mode of acquisition, prescription is subject to some qualifications. The 
ICJ held in Burkina Faso v Mali74 that preference should be given to legal 
title.75 This is partly because abandonment of territory is not to be presumed 
but should be clearly demonstrated, without any doubt, by the conduct of the 
parties. 76  However a failure to protest can lead to an assumption of 
acquiescence and the passing of title through prescription. In Pedra Branca77 
the ICJ said ‘silence may also speak, but only if the conduct of the other State 
calls for a response.’78 However the Court has not set down the exact 
requirements for effective protest. From the Court’s statement in Pedra 
Branca it appears that protests should be made a timely intervals, and be 
repeated to avoid possession becoming undisturbed.79 Attempting to bring a 
claim before an international tribunal is also an important aspect of protest.80  
 
Prescription was key in the Pedra Branca dispute between Malaysia and 
Singapore. The ICJ first considered original title and determined that it had 
been held by the Sultanate of Johor.81 The disputed islands were isolated and 
there were no rival claims, so very little was needed to establish sovereignty.82 
Jurisdiction had been exercised by the Orang Laut (Sea Gypsies) who formed 
an integral part of the island economy.83 Next, the Court considered recent 
effective occupation. Malaysia, as successor to the Sultanate of Johor, was 
presumed to continue the title unless it was abandoned. However Britain, and 
later Singapore, had exercised jurisdiction over Pedra Branca since 1844.84 
Between the 1920s-1990s, Singapore exercised jurisdiction by investigating 
                                                                                                                          
Rep 6, 32 (‘Temple of Preah Vihear’); Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad) 
(Judgment) [1994] ICJ Rep 6, 35-6 (‘Libya v Chad’).  
74 Burkina Faso v Mali [1986] ICJ Rep 554. 
75 Ibid 586-7. See also Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 867; Cameroon v Nigeria [2002] 
ICJ Rep 303, 353; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 232-3. 
76 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 233; Pedra Branca [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 
50-1. 
77 Pedra Branca [2008] ICJ Rep 12. 
78 Ibid 51; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 232-3.  
79 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 188.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Pedra Branca [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 31-40.  
82 Ibid 35-7. 
83 Ibid 37-9.  
84 Ibid 50-60. 
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shipwrecks, controlling visits to the island and flying the Singaporean 
ensign.85 Malaysia had never protested these actions and in fact had included 
Pedra Branca as Singaporean territory in reports and maps from the 1950s, 
60s and 70s.86 As a result of Malaysia’s failure to respond to Singapore’s acts 
of sovereignty, Malaysia was deemed to have acquiesced and title to Pedra 
Branca passed to Singapore.87 
 
(b) Subjugation 
 
Subjugation is an old form of title based on conquest and annexation.88 To 
establish it, conquest must have been followed by annexation.89 As a mode of 
acquisition, it has effectively been displaced by the prohibition of the use of 
force.90 However it is still used to support historic titles.91     
 
(c) Cession 
 
The final mode of acquisition is cession, where territory is transferred from 
the sovereign State to another State, who becomes the new sovereign.92 All 
States have a right to cede their territory, and may merge into another by 
                                                
85 Ibid 82-9.  
86 Ibid  87, 93-5. See also Frontier Dispute (Benin v Niger) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 90, 
119-20. 
87 Pedra Branca [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 96, 101. There were also two other features in dispute in 
this case, that of Middle Rocks and South Ledge. Middle Rocks remained with Malaysia as 
the successor to the Sultanate: at 99. South Ledge was considered a low-tide elevation and 
belonged to the State in whose territorial waters it was located, in this case Malaysia: at 101. 
88 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 698; Sibbett, above n 9, 1623; 
Haas, above n 9, 5; Lee, ‘Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial 
Acquisition’, above n 9, 10. 
89 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 699; Lee, ‘Continuing Relevance 
of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above n 9, 11. 
90 See The Covenant of the League of Nations art 10; General Treaty for the Renunciation of 
War, opened for signature 27 August 1928, 94 LNTS 57 (entered into force 24 July 1929) art 
1 (‘Kellogg Briand Pact’); Charter of the United Nations art 2 (‘UN Charter'); Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 25/2625, UNGAOR, 
25th sess, 1883rd plen mtg, Agenda Item 85, UN Doc A/Res/25/2625 (24 October 1970).  
91 Schoenbaum, above n 4, 212. See also Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above 
n 7, 705; Lee, ‘Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above 
n 9, 10. 
92 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 266; Jennings and Watts (eds), 
Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 679; Haas, above n 9, 5; Sibbett, above n 9, 1622-3; Lee, 
‘Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above n 9, 8. 
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ceding their entire territory.93 Both States must intend to pass sovereignty; 
another State can acquire governmental powers without sovereignty, which 
will not result in cession.94 Cession can only be affected by agreement, 
usually in the form of a treaty.95 It often forms part of a treaty of peace 
imposed by a victor.96 Cession usually comes into effect on the date that the 
treaty enters into force, without the need for any actual transfer of territory.97 
 
B Contiguity 
 
Although States can exercise sovereignty over territory far from the mainland, 
geography is a relevant factor in territorial disputes. In the case of islands, the 
principle of contiguity, the proximity and relationship of the island to another 
territory, is important.98 Contiguity is not a form of title. Huber expressly 
rejected the USA’s contiguity arguments in Island of Palmas saying that the 
principle had ‘no foundation in international law’ 99  and would lead to 
arbitrary results.100 Subsequent cases have shown a willingness to consider the 
principle. In Minquiers and Ecrehos the ICJ determined that the Minquiers 
group were a dependency of the Channel Islands and subject to the same 
authority. 101  Similar rulings and arguments were made in El 
Salvador/Honduras102 and Pedra Branca103 respectively. In the Caribbean 
                                                
93 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 680; Lee, ‘Continuing Relevance 
of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above n 9, 10.  
94 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 680; United States of America v 
Ushi Shiroma (1954) 21 ILR 82, 84-6; Puccini v Commissioner-General of the Government 
of the Territory of Trieste (1961) 40 ILR 43, 45.  
95 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 680. See Lee, ‘Continuing 
Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition’, above n 9, 8. 
96 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 681.  
97 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 266-7.  
98 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 193.  
99 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 869.  
100 Ibid 855.  
101 Minquiers and Ecrehos [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 67, 70-1; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over 
Dokdo’, above n 4, 193.  
102 El Salvador v Honduras [1992] ICJ Rep 351, 570, 579. See also Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty 
over Dokdo’, above n 4, 194; Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, ‘Problem of Contiguity, Natural Unity, 
and Ancient Original Title to Islands with Special Reference to Dokdo’, in Seokwoo Lee and 
Hee Eun Lee, Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011) 123, 147-8. 
103 Pedra Branca [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 97, 99-101. See also Kaikobad, above n 102, 147; 
Eritrea-Yemen (Phase 1) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 9 October 1998) 120, 127-8, 132, 
143-6; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 194; Kaikobad, above n 102, 134; 
Qatar and Bahrain [2001] ICJ Rep 40, 189-90 (Judges Ranejva and Koroma). 
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Sea 104  the ICJ considered proximity evidence but held that it was not 
determinative of title.105 This was demonstrated in Pedra Branca when the 
ICJ awarded title to Pedra Branca to Singapore despite the island being closer 
to Malaysia.106 
 
C Intertemporal Law & Critical Date 
 
Sovereignty disputes often have long histories and may take years to get to 
international adjudication. For these reasons there are two other important 
concepts to consider: the intertemporal law and critical date. Intertemporal 
law refers to the principle that the law which existed at the time title was 
allegedly acquired must be used to judge the acquisition.107 In Island of 
Palmas Huber stated that ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in light of the 
law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a 
dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.’108 The principle has led 
some scholars to question whether historical disputes in Asia can be judged in 
light of international law, which developed in a European context.109 However 
the ICJ decisions in Ligitan and Sipadan and Pedra Branca indicate that they 
are.  
 
Just as the law develops over time, so do the factual circumstances 
surrounding the dispute. The facts must be considered up to the “critical date” 
when the dispute arose or the issues were ‘definitely joined.’110 A dispute 
arises when there is a conflict between parties over law, fact or interests111 and 
                                                
104 Caribbean Sea [2007] ICJ Rep 659. 
105 Ibid 708-9. See also Kaikobad, above n 102, 153.  
106 Pedrozo, above n 4, 85. 
107 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 845; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 
8, 218; Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 
1951-4: General Principles and Sources of Law’ (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International 
Law 1, 5; Philip C Jessup, ‘The Palmas Island Arbitration’ (1928) 22 American Journal of 
International Law 735, 739-40. 
108 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 845.  
109 Lee, ‘Intertemporal Law’, above n 11, 125-6.  
110 Minquiers and Ecrehos [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 69; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, 
above n 4, 163.  
111 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v United Kingdom) (Jurisdiction) [1924] 
PCIJ (ser A) No 2, 11; Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom) (Preliminary 
Objections) [1963] ICJ Rep 15, 27; East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ 
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the claims positively oppose each other.112 Choosing the critical date is 
important because the dispute may arise long before the case is settled. Acts 
that occur after the critical date are generally inadmissible in order to avoid a 
party gaining advantage by avoiding or delaying settlement.113 Instead a State 
must demonstrate that they had acquired sovereignty by the critical date.114 
However the Court may still consider evidence that occurs after the date if 
those acts are ‘a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for 
the purpose of improving the legal position of the Party which relies on 
them.’115 In Island of Palmas, Huber took account of acts occurring after the 
critical date on the basis that those acts threw light on the preceding period.116 
 
Selecting the critical date is a question of substance within the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. 117  The ICJ is reluctant to select a date that would render 
considerable evidence inadmissible.118 In Minquiers and Ecrehos the ICJ 
accepted the British argument that the critical date was the date that the 
parties concluded the special agreement to submit the dispute to the Court.119 
In Eastern Greenland, the PCIJ selected the date that Norway formally 
announced its occupation of Eastern Greenland, which was only two days 
before the parties agreed to submit the dispute to the Court.120   
                                                                                                                          
Rep 90, 99-100 (‘East Timor’); Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 
of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (Advisory Opinion) [1998] 
ICJ Rep 12, 27; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 694. 
112 South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa) (Preliminary Objections) [1962] ICJ Rep 319, 
328; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 694. See also Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Advisory Opinion) (First Phase) [1950] ICJ 
Rep 65, 74. 
113 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 219; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over 
Dokdo’, above n 4, 163; Minquiers and Ecrehos [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 69.  
114 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 839. See also Western Sahara [1975] ICJ Rep 12, 
38. 
115 Ligitan and Sipadan  [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 682; Argentine-Chile Frontier Case (Palena) 
(Award) (1966) 38 ILR 10, 79-80; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 164.  
116 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 866; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 
4, 164. 
117 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 219; Jennings and Watts (eds), 
Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 711.  
118 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 163; Jennings and Watts (eds), 
Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 711.  
119 Minquiers and Ecrehos [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 59-60; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, 
above n 4, 163.  
120 Eastern Greenland [1933] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 53, 45; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over 
Dokdo’, above n 4, 163.  
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The critical date is an important factor in the Liancourt Rocks dispute, as 
discussed in Chapter III.121 
 
                                                
121 See below, Chapter III, pg 35-7 for discussion of the critical date in this dispute.  
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III SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE LIANCOURT ROCKS 
 
Japan and South Korea are the two primary claimants to the Liancourt Rocks. 
This chapter will assess their claims against the background of international 
law as outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
A Claims to Title 
1 Historic Title 
(a) Discovery: 512 AD to 1667 
 
Japan and South Korea both claimed original title over the Liancourt Rocks. 
South Korea’s claim is the oldest, dating back to 512AD. At the time, Korea 
comprised of three kingdoms, Goguryeo, Baekje and Silla, and a fourth 
confederation, Gaya.122 According to Korea’s oldest text, Samguk Sagi, a 
government official of Silla subjugated the Usanguk on Ulleungdo.123 South 
Korea argues that the Liancourt Rocks were a dependency of Ulleungdo and 
were subjugated too.124 However many old Korean documents and maps, 
including a 1454 survey of Silla Kingdom, only mention Ulleungdo.125 To 
overcome these deficiencies, South Korea relies on the principle of 
contiguity.126 
 
Later documents refer to both the Liancourt Rocks and Ulleungdo. A record 
from 930AD reflects that both islands were occupied by the Usanguk, a 
tributary state of the Goryeo Kingdom.127 Another record from 1432 also 
references the Liancourt Rocks.128 South Korea also relies on a number of 
                                                
122 Korea Culture and Information Services, History, Korea.Net  
<http://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Korea-at-a-Glance/History>.  
123 Choi, above n 2, 466; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 165; Pedrozo, 
above n 4, 84. See also Kaikobad, above n 102, 158; Chee, above n 2, 3; Haas, above n 9, 9; 
Kajimura, above n 1, 442. 
124 Choi, above n 2, 466; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 165; Schoenbaum, 
above n 4, 233. See also Sibbett, above n 9, 1637. 
125 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 165; Pedrozo, above n 4, 86; Kajimura, 
above n 1, 443. 
126 Discussed below at pp 33-4. 
127 By the mid 6th century the Silla Kingdom had gained control of the Gaya Confederation. It 
later subjugated Baejke (in 660) and Goguryeo (in 668).  In 918AD this developed into the 
Goryeo Dynasty: See Korea Culture and Information Services, History, above n 122.  
128 Pedrozo, above n 4, 85.  
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records129 referring to “Usando”, which South Korea claims is another name 
for the Liancourt Rocks, derived from the Usanguk.130 
 
By the 1400s Japan and Korea had begun to clash over the use of Ulleungdo 
(and the Liancourt Rocks, which were used as a stopover). Korean fishermen 
had been targeted by Japanese pirates. In 1416 the Joseon Dynasty131 issued a 
travel ban and prohibition of settlement on Ulleungdo for the dual purpose of 
protecting Korean nationals and preventing them from evading taxes and 
military service.132 Despite the ban, Koreans continued to travel to Ulleungdo. 
Korean records continued to reference the islands as an area of administrative 
control,133 which included sending inspectors to Ulleungdo every three years 
to enforce the ban there.134  
 
Japan’s earliest claim dates to the mid 17th century. Records from private 
Japanese collections show that Japanese nationals had visited the islands 
frequently from the early 17th century, using the Liancourt Rocks as a 
stopover en route to Ulleungdo. 135  The first official Japanese record 
referencing the Rocks is a report from 1667 of an observational trip to Oki 
Islands.136 The report stated the two islands, Ulleungdo and Liancourt Rocks, 
                                                
129 History of Goryeo (1451); Revised Edition of the Augmented Survey of the Geography of 
Korea (1530); Reference Compilation of Documents of Korea (1770); Book of Ten Thousand 
Techniques of Governance (1808). See Korea Culture and Information Services, Korean 
Government’s Official Position on Dokdo (2 February 2012) Korea.net  
<http://www.korea.net/Government/Current-Affairs/National-
Affairs/view?affairId=83&subId=233&articleId=1012>.  
130 Korea Culture and Information Services, Korean Government’s Official Position on 
Dokdo, above n 129; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 165; Schoenbaum, 
above n 4, 233. 
131 The Joseon Dynasty was also called the Choson Dynasty. It was formed in 1392 after 
overthrowing Goryeo. King Sejong the Great, its fourth monarch, ruled from 1418-1450. The 
Joseon Dynasty was ended in 1910 after Japanese annexation. See Korea Culture and 
Information Services, History, above n 122; Pedrozo, above n 4, 84. 
132 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 165; Chee, above n 2, 6; Kajimura, 
above n 1, 444. 
133 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 166.  
134 Ibid 166; Chee, above n 2, 7; Pedrozo, above n 4, 89. 
135 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 166  
136 The document’s name is Records on Observations in Oki (1667). See Ibid 167-8; Pedrozo, 
above n 4, 79; Kajimura, above n 1, 447. 
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were both uninhabited, both noted that Oki Islands were the northwestern 
limit of Japan.137   
 
In 1618 the Japanese Tokugawa Shogunate138 granted permission to two 
merchants named Kinkichi Ohya and Ichibei Murakawa to travel to 
Ulleungdo to engage in commercial activities.139 The families sought to 
establish a fishing monopoly in the area. They used the Liancourt Rocks as a 
docking point and fishing ground on the way to Ulleungdo.140 
 
(b) The Takeshima Affair: 1693-1696 
 
These clashes culminated in the Takeshima Affair of 1693.141 The Ohya and 
Murayama families encountered numerous Koreans fishing at Ulleungdo in 
violation of the vacant island policy. To protect their fishing monopoly, the 
families sought to stop the Koreans. They took two Korean fishermen, Ahn 
Yong-bok and Park Eo-doon, back to Japan.142 This prompted Japan to begin 
negotiations with Korea over fishing rights around Ulleungdo. Negotiations 
initially focused on fishing rights, but later developed into a sovereignty 
dispute over Ulleungdo and the Liancourt Rocks.143 Negotiations ended in 
1696 when Japanese issued a travel ban on Ulleungdo.144 This decision 
effectively surrendered any Japanese claim to title over Ulleungdo to Korea.  
 
The impact of this decision is unclear. Japan claims that the ban did not apply 
to the Liancourt Rocks and that Japan never surrendered their claims to the 
                                                
137 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 166. See also Kaikobad, above n 102, 
159. 
138 The Tokugawa Shogunate was the last feudal government in Japan, which existed between 
1603-1868. The head of government was called the “Shogun” and each Shogun was a 
member of the Tokugawa family clan.  
139 Pedrozo, above n 4, 79; Schoenbaum, above n 4, 233; Kajimura, above n 1, 447. 
140 Pedrozo, above n 4, 79. See also Kajimura, above n 1, 447-9. 
141 Although Takeshima is now the Japanese name for the Liancourt Rocks, in the 1600s it 
was used to refer to Ulleungdo. Matsushima was the Japanese name for the Rocks. 
142 Masaharu Yanagihara, ‘Japan’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 475, 484. See 
also Choi, above n 2, 466; Kaikobad, above n 102, 160. 
143 Yanagihara, above n 142, 484.  
144 Ibid 484. See also Pedrozo, above n 4, 87; Chee, above n 2, 6; Schoenbaum, above n 4, 
233; Pedrozo, above n 4, 79; Choi, above n 2, 466; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, 
above n 4, 166. 
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Rocks.145 Korea, believing the Rocks to be an appendage of Ulleungdo, argue 
that the concession included the Rocks which were never used as a sole 
destination for Japanese travellers.146 South Korea claims that Japan provided 
Ahn Yong-bok with written confirmation that both Ulleungdo and the 
Liancourt Rocks were Korean territory.147 Japan denies this allegation and 
South Korea has never been able to produce the document.148 South Korea 
explains this by saying that it was confiscated by the Lord of Tsushima,149 but 
there is no contemporary evidence of this.150   
 
(c) The Vacant Island: 1700 to 1905 
 
Several Japanese maps produced in the 1700s do not include the Liancourt 
Rocks as Japanese territory. A map from 1778 includes the Liancourt Rocks 
but does not list them as Japanese territory.151 A 1785 map by prominent 
scholar Hayashi Shihei listed both the Liancourt Rocks and Ulleungdo as 
Korean territory.152 Other maps, including official maps, from the late 1700s 
to 1921 support this.153 By contrast, Korean maps from the same period do 
include the Liancourt Rocks as Korean territory.154 
 
Japanese interest in the Liancourt Rocks increased after 1868,155 when Japan 
abandoned its policy of seclusion and took a greater interest in international 
affairs as it sought to modernise.156 In 1869 the Japanese government sent a 
team to Korea tasked with discovering how Ulleungdo and the Liancourt 
                                                
145 Kaikobad, above n 102, 161; Choi, above n 2, 466. 
146 Pedrozo, above n 4, 87. 
147 Ibid. See also Kaikobad, above n 102, 161. 
148 Pedrozo, above n 4, 87.  
149 Tsushima was the administrative region of Japan that Ahn Yong-bok and Park Eo-doon 
were taken too. See Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 166.  
152 Ibid 166-7. 
153 Ibid 167, 174; Kaikobad, above n 102, 159. 
154 Pedrozo, above n 4, 88. 
155 1868 was an important year in Japanese history. In 1868 the Tokugawa Shogunate was 
abolished and the Emperor restored in what was known as the Meiji Restoration: Choi, above 
n 2, 467. 
156 See Ibid; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 166; Seokwoo Lee, ‘The 1951 
San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia’ (2002) 11 
Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 63, 65. 
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Rocks became Korean territories. The team reported back in 1870, confirming 
that they were both Korean territory.157 Based on this report, the Dajokan158 
rejected requests from Japanese nationals for commercial rights to Ulleungdo, 
confirming that both Ulleungdo and the Liancourt Rocks were not Japanese 
territory.159 
 
In 1899 there were incidents of Japanese infringement upon Ulleungdo.160 
This prompted Korea to issue the Imperial Ordinance No 41 in 1900, 
incorporating Ulleungdo into Uldo County. 161  The Ordinance did not 
specifically refer to the Liancourt Rocks, but to Ulleungdo, Jukdo and 
Seokdo. 162  South Korea argues that Seokdo, which translates to “Rock 
Islands”, is the Liancourt Rocks.163 
 
Both parties have evidence of historical links to the Liancourt Rocks but this 
evidence is ambiguous and relies on a connection between the Rocks and 
Ulleungdo.164 However, given the Rocks are isolated and uninhabited, very 
little is needed to establish sovereignty over them.165 Neither party is likely to 
succeed in establishing title on the basis of these historical acts alone. Korea’s 
first title is based on subjugation, but the conquest does not appear to have 
been followed by annexation of the Rocks themselves, as is required at 
international law.166 Korea may also have an earlier claim to discovery but 
there is no evidence of effective occupation and therefore the inchoate title is 
incomplete. 167  Korean administration covered Ulleungdo, but did not 
necessarily stretch to the Liancourt Rocks. The Korean fishermen who 
                                                
157 Choi, above n 2, 467; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 174. 
158 Japanese Council of State, then the highest national decision making body. 
159 Choi, above n 2, 467; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 174.  
160 Choi, above n 2, 467; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 175. 
161 Sibbett, above n 9, 88; Pedrozo, above n 4, 88; Choi, above n 2, 467; Van Dyke, 
‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 175. 
162 Chee, above n 2, 10. See also Kajimura, above n 1, 456. 
163 Choi, above n 2, 467; Chee, above n 2, 9; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 
4, 175. See also Schoenbaum, above n 4, 235; Kajimura, above n 1, 456. 
164 See below, pp 33-4 for discussion of South Korea’s claim to contiguity. 
165 See Chapter II, pp 6-10 for discussion of the law of effective occupation. 
166 See Chapter II, p 12 for discussion of the law of subjugation.  
167 See Chapter II, pp 5-6, for discussion of the law of discovery. 
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travelled to the Rocks were not official State agents and for many years 
operated against Korean law by breaching the vacant island policy.168   
 
Japanese fishermen did have official support, but this was focused on 
Ulleungdo. The Liancourt Rocks were only used as a stopover. In 1696 
Ulleungdo became decisively Korean territory but there is no evidence that 
this extended to the Liancourt Rocks. The Takeshima Affair does not provide 
conclusive evidence for either party. Afterwards, Japan appears to have had 
little interest in the Rocks. Japanese maps did not include it as Japanese 
territory and official statements indicate it was considered Korean territory. 
Like Indonesia in Ligitan and Sipadan, this is likely to be significant evidence 
against Japan.169  
 
The strongest evidence of original title is Korea’s 1900 incorporation, but this 
also has problems. First, it does not specifically refer to the Liancourt Rocks, 
although it is easy to accept that “Seokdo” is one of the many names for them. 
Second, and most importantly, it does not appear to have been enforced 
through actual effective occupation. This is partly due to the context, as Korea 
faced increasing pressure from Japan.170 However on its own, the 1900 
incorporation is not conclusive enough to found a valid title.    
 
2 Impact of War 
(a) Annexation: 1904-1945 
 
Japan occupied the Liancourt Rocks in 1904 as a military base during the 
Russo-Japanese War.171 By this time, Japan had modernised considerably and 
was beginning to emerge as a major power on the international stage. This 
was aptly demonstrated when Japan defeated Russia and secured Japanese 
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169 See Chapter II, pp 9-10. 
170 See eg Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 169-72. 
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interests in Korea.172 Afterwards Japan began to increase its control in Korea, 
installing Japanese advisers in the Korean government to control government 
policy.173 This resulted in the 1904 Japanese-Korean Protectorate Treaty that 
rendered Korea subject to Japan.174     
 
In 1905 Japan issued Public Notice No 40 incorporating the Liancourt Rocks 
into Shimane Prefecture.175 Although it was standard practice to notify other 
States this type of occupation, Japan did not make any international 
notification.176 However there is no requirement to do so at international 
law.177 Korea did not protest. In fact, the Korean government did not become 
aware of the incorporation until 1906.178 By then Korea was in no position to 
protest because its government was effectively controlled by Japanese 
advisers, who were tacitly supported by the Western powers.179 This left 
Korea with very few avenues to issue any diplomatic protests. 
 
Japan initially claimed that the Liancourt Rocks were terra nullius in 1905 and 
therefore susceptible to effective occupation.180 However Japan later claimed 
that Japanese sovereignty had been established over the Rocks in the 17th 
century, and that the 1905 incorporation was simply a re-affirmation of that 
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claim.181 This change in stance led Professor Van Dyke to argue that Japan 
would be estopped from claiming sovereignty earlier than 1905.182 Estoppel is 
a general principle of international law 183  but its applications is not 
uniform.184 Estoppel requires that an authorised, voluntary, and unambiguous 
statement of fact was made and relied on by another State to its detriment, or 
to the advantage of the party who made the statement.185 However in this case 
there is no evidence that Korea has relied on these Japanese statements, as 
both States were already pursuing separate claims. As such there is no reason 
why Japan could not re-frame their arguments.186  
 
Japan controlled the Liancourt Rocks from 1905 onwards. During this time 
they were responsible for levying taxes and issuing fishing licenses,187 but 
made no attempts to formally integrate the Rocks into Japanese territory.188 In 
1910 Japan formally annexed Korea.189 From 1910 to 1945 Korea was 
subjected to harsh Japanese rule which has marred relations between the two 
and resulted in the Liancourt Rocks dispute becoming an emotional issue.190 
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(b) Post War: 1945-1951 
(i) Wartime Planning 
 
In 1939 World War Two broke out in Europe and later extended to the Pacific 
in 1941 following Japanese attacks on Hong Kong and Pearl Harbour. During 
the war Japan pursued an aggressive policy of expansion that saw it invade 
several Asian countries. By the end of the war Japanese forces had been 
pushed back to the four main islands of Japan: Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku 
and Kyushu.  
 
As the war drew to a close, the Allies began planning the post-war world. This 
included allocating occupied and disputed territories to different States. 
Territory allocation was to be based upon the principles outlined in the 
Atlantic Charter, 191  which stipulated that there was to be no territorial 
aggrandisement or territorial change against the wishes of the people 
concerned.192 In 1943 the Allies adopted the Cairo Declaration,193 which 
stated that Japan was to be ‘expelled from all other territories which she has 
taken by violence and greed.’194 The Cairo Declaration specifically referred to 
the ‘enslavement of Korea’195 but did not mention specific territories like the 
Liancourt Rocks. Korean territories were not mentioned in the 1945 Yalta 
Protocol196 either, which had included a list of territories to be passed from 
Japan to Russia.197 The Cairo Declaration formed the basis for the 1945 
Potsdam Declaration198 which provided that ‘Japanese sovereignty shall be 
limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku and such 
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minor islands as we determine.’199 It did not state which minor islands were to 
be included. 
 
(ii) SCAPINs 
 
The Pacific War ended on 15 August 1945. Japan formally surrendered on 2 
September 1945 and accepted the terms of the Potsdam and Cairo 
Declarations.200 Japanese territory was occupied by Allied forces, as was 
Korea. General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (‘SCAP’) was placed in control of the occupation. SCAP removed the 
Liancourt Rocks from Japanese control and placed them within the Japanese 
based US Sixth Army’s Occupation Zone instead of the Korean based XXIV 
Corps Zone.201 SCAP issued Instruction Notes (known as ‘SCAPINs’) to 
govern Allied occupation policy. Three of these are relevant to the Liancourt 
Rocks dispute. 
 
The first is SCAPIN 677,202 issued on 20 January 1946. Article 3 provided 
that, for the purposes of the directive, Japan was defined to include the four 
main islands of Japan and approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands 
excluding the Liancourt Rocks.203 However Article 6 provided that nothing in 
the document was to be considered an indication of Allied policy regarding 
the determination of the minor islands referred to in the Potsdam 
Declaration.204  
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The second note was SCAPIN 1033,205 issued on 22 June 1946 concerning 
Japanese fishing areas. Article 3 repeated the definition of Japanese territory 
from SCAPIN 677.206  It went on to provide that Japanese vessels and 
personnel were not to approach more than 12 miles to the Liancourt Rocks 
and were not to have any contact with the island.207 However it also provided 
that it was not an indication of Allied policy.208 
 
The final important note was SCAPIN 1778,209 issued on 16 September 1947. 
This designated the Liancourt Rocks as a US bombing range and required the 
US to notify the Japanese government before conducting operations there.210 
However the deaths of several Koreans in the area prompted protests from the 
Commanding General of US Armed Forces in Korea and led to the range 
being closed.211 It was eventually reopened with the Korean government’s 
permission.212 
 
(iii) The Peace Treaty 
 
The most important post-war document in this dispute is the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, signed in September 1951.213 The Treaty formally ended the 
Pacific War and was the result of a long drafting history influenced by Cold 
War politics. The first draft was produced in March 1947.214 This draft, along 
with those produced in August 1947, November 1947, January 1948, October 
1949 and November 1949 all listed the Liancourt Rocks as Korean 
territory.215  
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The establishment of a communist regime in North Korea in 1949 changed 
US perspectives. Committed to resisting communism, the US saw Japan as a 
bulwark against communism in Asia.216 The US feared that a harsh peace 
could leave Japan susceptible to communist influence.217 This led to a change 
of attitude towards Japan’s claim to the Liancourt Rocks.218 In 1949, William 
J Sebald, the US Political Adviser to SCAP wrote that ‘Japan’s claim to these 
islands is old and appears valid. Security considerations might conceivably 
envisage weather and radar stations thereon’.219 This contradicted earlier US 
studies by the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee in 1946, which had 
concluded that the Liancourt Rocks were historically Korean territory.220 The 
next draft was produced in December 1949 in light of Sebald’s 
commentary.221 Article 3 of this new draft listed the Liancourt Rocks as 
Japanese territory for the first time.222 
 
The December 1949 draft was the last to mention the Liancourt Rocks. The 
allocation of territory had divided the Allies. For example, in respect of the 
Liancourt Rocks, the Commonwealth generally supported Korea223 while the 
US supported Japan. John Foster Dulles, who became responsible for drafting 
the Treaty in 1950,224 sought to expedite the process by simplifying the 
Treaty. 225 His first draft, in August 1950, did not provide any specific 
territorial delimitation.226 The next draft, written in March 1951, included a 
renunciation of Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), Antarctica and the Kuriles,227 but 
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made no mention of the Liancourt Rocks.228 After British negotiations, it was 
finally agreed to list Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet as Korean 
territory.229 The Liancourt Rocks were not included.  
 
The Korean government was shown a draft of the treaty prepared in June 
1951. In response, Korea requested that the Liancourt Rocks be listed as 
Korean territory.230 Dulles indicated that he was willing to do so231 but the 
final US answer was given by Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs.232 Rusk wrote to the South Korean ambassador in August 
1951 and stated that:   
 
As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, 
this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never 
treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the 
Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane prefecture of Japan. This island does not 
appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea.233 
 
Rusk’s response contradicted previous US studies and drafts, but it effectively 
ended the treaty debate. The final Treaty provided in Article 2 that Japan 
recognised Korean independence and renounced ‘all right, title and claim to 
Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.’234 It did 
not mention the Liancourt Rocks.  
 
(iv) Final Result 
 
Japan’s strongest claim to the Liancourt Rocks occurred in 1905 following its 
incorporation into the Shimane Prefecture but it is of little help to Japan’s case 
at international law. The incorporation occurred at a time when Japan was 
expanding its control in Asia and after Korea had become subject to Japanese 
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influence. As a result, Korea was in no position to effectively protest the 
incorporation. Just five years later Japan annexed Korea itself. Japan’s 
continued aggression and expansion eventually resulted in the Pacific War.  
 
Given Korea was effectively non-existent as a State between 1905-1945, 
Japan’s effective occupation of the Liancourt Rocks during this period means 
very little. However this does not mean that the Liancourt Rocks were part of 
the territory stripped from Japan at the end of the war. It may or may not be 
considered territory taken ‘by violence and greed.’ It may also be considered a 
‘minor island’ as mentioned in the Potsdam Declaration. These wartime 
documents are ambiguous.    
 
The drafting history of the San Francisco Peace Treaty does lend weight to 
South Korea’s claims. The final decision not to include the Liancourt Rocks, 
in the context of the Cold War, is not a definitive determination in Japan’s 
favour. However equally those drafts which listed the Rocks as Korean 
territory were just that – drafts. These drafts, like the SCAPINs, were simply 
reflections of changing Allied policy at the end of a messy world war. They 
do not establish Korea’s claims or destroy Japan’s. However the documents, 
combined with evidence of continued Korean presence on the Rocks 
(demonstrated by the Koreans killed from US bombing in the region) do lend 
support to South Korea. Ultimately, the Allies were unable to agree on the 
Liancourt Rocks issue and left it intentionally ambiguous. This ambiguity 
helps and hinders both parties.  
 
3 Modern Day 
 
The modern dispute began in 1952 after the first South Korean President, 
Syngman Rhee, drew the ‘Peace Line’ in the Sea of Japan.235 The Peace Line 
declared South Korean sovereignty over the area, including the Liancourt 
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Rocks. 236  Japan protested this proclamation. 237  South Korea did not 
immediately move to occupy the Rocks. At the time, South Korea was in the 
midst of the Korean War, which ended in 1953. Japan also made no moves to 
occupy the Rocks during this time. 
 
The next development occurred in 1954. In May 1954 nationals of both 
countries travelled to the Rocks under military protection to plant their 
national flag and stake their country’s claim.238 In August 1954 South Korea 
took the next step to establish effective occupation by building a lighthouse on 
the Rocks.239 This met with immediate Japanese protest and prompted Japan 
to propose submitting the dispute to the ICJ.240 Korea rejected the proposal, 
claiming that there was no dispute because the Liancourt Rocks were 
inherently Korean territory.241  
 
Between 1952 and 1960 there were further diplomatic exchanges regarding 
the Liancourt Rocks. Japan sent a total of 24 notices to South Korea, which 
South Korea responded to with a further 18 notices.242 Both States had an 
opportunity to resolve the dispute in 1965 with the conclusion of the Basic 
Treaty 243  which normalised Japanese-South Korean relations. During 
negotiations for the Basic Treaty, Japan had attempted to make the Liancourt 
Rocks an official agenda item but South Korea refused because they 
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maintained that the Rocks were Korean territory.244 South Korea argues that 
the failure to include the Liancourt Rocks in the Basic Treaty ended the 
dispute. The Rocks were not mentioned in the official records, but are 
included in the negotiators’ private records.245   
 
Since 1965, the Liancourt Rocks have been a point of ongoing contention 
between Japan and South Korea. In 1966 South Korea conducted military 
exercises in the region, prompting Japanese protests.246 In 2004 South Korea 
sparked Japanese outrage by issuing a postage stamp depicting the Liancourt 
Rocks.247 Japanese records and maps continue to list the Liancourt Rocks as 
Japanese territory.248 The Shimane Prefecture has taken several steps to 
symbolise their authority over the Rocks. They designated 22 February 2005, 
the anniversary of the 1905 incorporation, as ‘Takeshima Day’ to reaffirm 
Japanese sovereignty.249 This led to passionate protests in South Korea.250 The 
Shimane Prefecture has allowed citizens to transfer their residency 
registration to the Liancourt Rocks and has granted mining rights over the 
area to Japanese citizens.251 Japan also sends Marine Safety Agency vessels to 
the area to reaffirm their claims.252 There have been a number of maritime 
clashes between fishermen and scientific research groups in the area.253 Both 
States have websites devoted to the issue.254 
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In the meantime South Korea has built upon the Liancourt Rocks. Since 1954 
South Korea has built a wharf, police garrison and desalination plant to 
compensate for the lack of fresh water.255 In 1965 Jongduck Choi became the 
first South Korean to live on the Rocks.256 Today, South Korea maintains a 
small transient population on the Rocks. 257  This includes one family, 
approximately 40-47 coast guards, 5 lighthouse managers and 2 staff 
members of the Dokdo Management Office.258 
 
Just as the ICJ held in Minquiers and Ecrehos, recent history will be decisive 
in the Liancourt Rocks dispute.259 The historic title is ambiguous but since 
1952 there is clear evidence of effective occupation by South Korea. Since 
South Korea emerged as a State it has taken steps to solidify its title to the 
Liancourt Rocks. Japan missed the opportunity to take the first step. It has 
protested South Korean activity, but not forcefully even when South Korea’s 
actions demanded a strong answer.260 Japan has prioritised its relationship 
with South Korea over its claim to the Liancourt Rocks. In light of its 
ambiguous claim to title and lack of effective control, this decision may have 
cost Japan its opportunity to successfully claim sovereignty.      
 
B Contiguity 
 
South Korea’s claims often rely on the principle of contiguity. South Korea 
argues that Ulleungdo and the Liancourt Rocks form a single unit and 
therefore acts pertaining to Ulleungdo also apply to the Rocks.261 Japan seeks 
to separate the two, claiming that only Ulleungdo was surrendered in 1696, 
not the Liancourt Rocks.262 
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Historically there is evidence that both States considered the Liancourt Rocks 
to be an appendage of Ulleungdo. In 1667 Japanese observational report on 
Oki Island refers to the proximity between the two islands and the fact that the 
Rocks are visible from Ulleungdo on a clear day.263 A French national 
working for the Pusan Customs Office in Korea reported that there were two 
big islands appendant to Ulleungdo.264 Two official Japanese documents from 
1870 and 1877 link the Liancourt Rocks and Ulleungdo.265 
 
Geographically there are close ties. The Liancourt Rocks are only 87km from 
Ulleungdo, whereas they are 157km from Oki Island.266 Ulleungdo and the 
Liancourt Rocks are both part of the Paektu volcanic range, situated in the 
deepest part of the Sea of Japan.267 The Rocks are located on the Yamato Rise 
and are separated from Ulleungdo by the Tusima Basin.268 The Liancourt 
Rocks do not share these similarities with the Oki Islands.  These geographic 
ties are reflected in human activity. The Liancourt Rocks were never a sole 
destination for travellers, but rather a stopover for Ulleungdo.  
 
Contiguity does not found a title but it can support South Korea’s claims, 
especially given the ambiguity surrounding traditional title.269 As a small, 
isolated, uninhabited rock the Liancourt Rocks could easily be considered an 
appendage to Ulleungdo, its closest neighbour and a larger, inhabited island. 
This is supported by the geographic similarities and historical connection 
between the two. Contiguity will help overcome the defects of the earlier title 
claims and tip the balance further in favour of South Korea.  
 
 
                                                
263 Translated extract reproduced in Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 166. 
See also Kaikobad, above n 102, 125; Kajimura, above n 1, 438-9. 
264 Kaikobad, above n 102, 160.  
265 An 1870 report by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Dajokan Directive of 1877: Ibid 
161-2.  
266 Ibid 125; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 157. 
267 Kaikobad, above n 102, 168; Kajimura, above n 1, 437. 
268 Kaikobad, above n 102, 168.  
269 See Chapter II, pp 13-4 for discussion of the principle of contiguity. 
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C The Critical Date 
 
The critical date could be an important factor in the Liancourt Rocks dispute 
because of its long history. If a date is chosen, all acts occurring afterwards 
may be inadmissible.270 There has been an active dispute over the Rocks since 
at least 1696 (the Takeshima Affair) but this leaves out a lot of important 
history, including the explicit claims to sovereignty made in 1900 and 1905. 
There are a few potential critical dates: 1905, after Japan’s incorporation; 
1952, after the proclamation of the Peace Line; 1954, when Japan proposed 
sending the dispute to the ICJ; or a date yet to be determined if and when the 
dispute is finally submitted to a Court or tribunal.  
 
Japan and Korea’s claims clearly opposed each other in 1905 when Japan 
incorporated the Liancourt Rocks into Shimane Prefecture. This directly 
contradicted Korea’s 1900 incorporation. However 1905 is not a suitable date 
because of the surrounding context. As the Korean government was unable to 
effectively protest this action, selecting 1905 would unfairly disadvantage 
South Korea. It would also ignore the impact of World War Two, of which the 
1905 incorporation could be seen as an early part. As a result 1905 is not a 
suitable critical date.  
 
The modern dispute began in 1952 after South Korea proclaimed the Peace 
Line. Japan immediately protested this, making it clear that there was a 
dispute in the modern era. Importantly, this affirmed South Korea’s intention 
to pursue Korea’s ancient claim. 1952 is a highly possible date, but excludes 
consideration of events in 1954 when Japan proposed sending the dispute to 
the ICJ. Japanese protests in 1952 did not indicate any intention to formally 
pursue the dispute, but the 1954 proposal did. As such, 1952 is not suitable.  
 
1954 is the most likely critical date. It marked the first modern evidence of 
effective possession, when South Korea built the lighthouse. The foundation 
                                                
270 See Chapter II, pp 14-6 for discussion of the law of the critical date. 
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of the dispute became clear when South Korea rejected Japan’s ICJ proposal. 
South Korea argued that there was no dispute because the Rocks were 
inherently Korean territory, but the very existence of Japanese claims over 
such a long history proves otherwise. In 1954 there was a clear dispute to be 
resolved. 
 
The key problem with 1954 is that it potentially excludes the considerable 
developments that have occurred since. The ICJ is reluctant to hamper its 
discretion to consider later events, and it is the later events which are the key 
to resolving the dispute. South Korean actions after 1954 solidify Korea’s 
claims to title. Delaying settlement for this reason was exactly why the critical 
date was developed. Nonetheless the Court could still consider evidence after 
1954. South Korea had begun the process of building upon the Rocks in 1954 
so subsequent acts to strengthen this can be considered a continuation of these 
initial works. In response, Japan would be able to lead evidence of its 
continued protests. Therefore using 1954 as the critical date would not 
necessarily prevent the Court from considering these developments. 
 
Two developments may be excluded if 1954 is the critical date. These are the 
1965 Basic Treaty and the 1999 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (‘UNCLOS’).271 The Basic Treaty throws light on Japanese and South 
Korean actions in the modern era by providing a framework for their 
relationship. It evidences their priorities and the context in which Japan has 
made only muted protests. The Court may therefore be able to consider it in 
light of Huber’s statement in Island of Palmas to throw light on an earlier 
period.272 UNCLOS meanwhile has expanded the dispute but has not affected 
the critical question of sovereignty because sovereignty over waters follows 
sovereignty over the land.273 
 
                                                
271 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 
1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’). 
272 See Chapter II, p 15. 
273 See Chapter V, (starting p 273) for discussion of UNCLOS and its impact on this dispute. 
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Given the dispute’s long history, the Court is unlikely to focus on any specific 
date. Instead the Court will likely consider the dispute in context, taking 
account of its history and any developments up until the time of submission to 
the Court. It is impossible to know when that will be. Later events may 
change the nature of the dispute – and the critical date – again. However of 
the dates currently marked in the Liancourt Rocks dispute, 1954 is the logical 
date. Japan’s proposal to submit the dispute to the ICJ marked the first time 
that there was a clearly defined dispute to resolve. 1954 would allow the 
Court to consider the actions of both parties in the modern era, but within 
context. It would protect the interests of both parties by allowing them to 
present their evidence, qualified by the fact that in 1954 both knew there was 
a dispute to be answered. 
 
D Conclusion 
 
The Liancourt Rocks have a long and complicated history. Given their nature 
as isolated, uninhabited rocks, very little is necessary to establish effective 
control. Despite this, title through many centuries has been ambiguous. Many 
historical records do not refer to the Liancourt Rocks, or refer to them by 
different names. Discovery and conquest were not followed by effective 
occupation or annexation by either party. Interest in the Rocks was primarily 
fuelled by fishermen and not pursued by governments. The advent of war 
prevented Korea from pushing her 1900 claim and has marred Japan’s 1905 
incorporation. It renders the long, stable Japanese rule between 1905-1945 
meaningless. After the war, the Allies faced a unique opportunity to resolve 
the dispute but failed to grasp the chance, prioritising security concerns over 
territorial stability. 
 
Recent history is critical. Since South Korea emerged after World War Two it 
has actively pursued its claim. Japan has been one step behind every step of 
the way. Japanese protests have been continual, but muted. In order to achieve 
agreements like the Basic Treaty and those in fishing rights, Japan has 
dropped the Liancourt Rocks from its agenda. Given South Korea’s 
intensifying control over the Rocks, these protests are not sufficient to sustain 
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Japan’s claim, especially as it is ambiguous at best. The combination of 
historic links, proximity and modern day control trip the balance in South 
Korea’s favour. In the act of measuring the titles against each other, South 
Korea would ultimately come out on top.  
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IV NORTH KOREA 
 
The Liancourt Rocks dispute has focussed on Japan and South Korea as the 
two claimants to the Rocks but there is a third potential claimant: North 
Korea. North Korea’s ability to claim the Liancourt Rocks is affected by 
several factors including their history, statehood and ability to intervene in the 
current dispute.  
 
A History of Two Koreas 
 
1 One War to Another 
 
In 1910, Korea ceased to operate as an independent State in international law 
following its annexation by Japan.274 When World War Two ended in 1945, 
securing Korean independence was one of the key United Nations (‘UN’) 
goals.275 However for military reasons, Korea was divided into spheres of 
influence along the 38th parallel. 276  Japanese forces north of the line 
surrendered to Soviet forces while those in the south surrendered to the 
Americans.277 This arrangement was meant to be temporary, but difficulties 
soon arose in reunifying the Korean Peninsula. At the Moscow Conference in 
1945, the USA, UK and USSR agreed to establish a US-USSR Joint 
Commission tasked with negotiating a short-term trusteeship (of less than five 
                                                
274 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law 
(Longman, 9th ed, 1992) vol 1A, 206, 210; D P O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law 
and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1967), vol 1, 36; James Crawford, The 
Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 466; Treaty of 
Annexation; Hara, above n 6, 17. See also Protectorate Treaty; 1904 Korea-Japan 
Agreement.  
275 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1A, above n 274, 134; The Problem of the 
Independence of Korea, GA Res 112 (III), UN GAOR, 1st Comm, 2nd sess, 112th plen mtg, 
Agenda Item 60, UN Doc A/Res/112(II) (14 November 1947) (‘Resolution 112’); Complaint 
of Aggression upon the Republic of Korea, SC Res 82, UN SCOR, 473rd mtg, UN Doc 
S/Res/82 (25 June 1950) (‘Resolution 82’); The Problem of the Independence of Korea, GA 
Res 293 (IV), UN GAOR, Ad Hoc Pol Com, 4th sess, 233rd plen mtg, Agenda Item 22, UN 
Doc A/Res 293(IV) (21 October 1949) (‘Resolution 293’); The Korean Question, GA Res 
811(IX), UN GAOR, 1st Comm, 9th sess, 510th plen mtg, Agenda Item 17a, UN Doc 
A/Res/811(IX) (11 December 1954) ‘Resolution 811’);  Question of Korea, GA Res 
2668(XXV), 1st Comm, 25th sess, 1919th plen mtg, Agenda Item 98, UN Doc 
A/Res/2668(XXV) (7 December 1970) (‘Resolution 2668’). 
276 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 467; Hara, above n 6, 20. 
277 Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Order No 1, SWNCC21/8 (issued 17 August 1945) 1b, 1e; 
Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 467. 
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years) over Korea and establishing a provisional Korean government.278 
However negotiations to reunite Korea failed and led the USA to refer the 
problem to the UN General Assembly in 1947.279 
 
In November 1947 the UN agreed to establish a Temporary Commission on 
Korea and adopted a resolution recognising the ‘urgent and rightful claims to 
independence of the people of Korea.’280 To achieve this, the UN voted to 
conduct general elections under UN observation and establish a unified 
government on the basis of those elections.281 The USSR objected and refused 
to allow access to North Korea. As a result, elections were limited to the 
South and the Republic of Korea (‘ROK’) was established on 15 August 
1948.282 In response the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (‘DPRK’) 
was established in the north on 9 September 1948.283 Its government posts 
were filled with Soviet trained communists and the new “State” was 
recognised by the USSR and its satellites.284 In December, the UN formally 
recognised the ROK as the only elected and lawful government in Korea with 
effective control and jurisdiction over the south.285 
 
                                                
278 Communiqué on the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, signed at 
Moscow on 27 December 1945, and Report of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United 
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Preparation of Peace Treaties and to Certain Other Problems, USSR-UK-USA, signed 26-7 
December 1945, 20 UNTS 272 (entered into force 27 December 1945) Part III; Hara, above n 
6, 21; Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 467. 
279 Hara, above n 6, 21; Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 467. 
280 Resolution 112, UN Doc A/Res/112(II); Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 467. 
281 Resolution 112, UN Doc A/Res/112(II); Hara, above n 6, 21. 
282 Hara, above n 6, 21. See also Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 467; ‘The 
Problem of the Independence of Korea’ (1948-9) The Yearbook of the United Nations 287, 
287-9; ‘The Question of Korea’ (1950) The Yearbook of the United Nations 220, 256. 
283 Hara, above n 6, 22. 
284 Ibid; Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1A, above n 274, 134. 
285 Hara, above n 6, 22; The Problem of the Independence of Korea, GA Res 195(III), UN 
GAOR, 1st Comm, 3rd sess, 187th plen mtg, Agenda Item 16, UN Doc A/Res/195(III) (12 
December 1948) (‘Resolution 195’). See also Resolution 82, UN Doc S/Res/82; Resolution 
293, UN Doc A/Res 293(IV); The Problem of the Independence of Korea, GA Res 376(V), 1st 
comm, 5th sess, 294th plen mtg, Agenda Item 24, UN Doc A/Res/376(V) (7 October 1950) 
(‘Resolution 376’); ‘The Problem of the Independence of Korea’, above n 282, 292. 
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Following the establishment of two Korean governments, both the USSR and 
USA withdrew their military forces.286 However events quickly escalated and 
on 25 June 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and invaded 
South Korea, beginning the Korean War.287 The UN Security Council288 
authorised a substantial NATO force to assist South Korea.289 Within three 
months NATO had achieved their objective by expelling all North Korean 
forces from the South, but they continued across the 38th parallel in hope of 
reuniting Korea.290 This prompted China to intervene militarily, to push 
NATO back across the 38th parallel.291 There, fighting came to a deadlock and 
ceasefire talks began in 1951.292 In 1953 the UN and North Korea finally 
signed a Military Armistice Agreement. 293  South Korea was not a 
signatory.294 The Armistice was not a peace treaty – it did not end the war, it 
simply paused it. It established a ceasefire line roughly approximate to the 
38th parallel and created a Demilitarised Zone around it.295 This solidified the 
divide between North and South Korea.   
 
2 Modern Day 
 
During the Korean War another event occurred which further complicated the 
legal situation in Korea. Japan had maintained its claim to sovereignty over 
                                                
286 Hara, above n 6, 22. This was in line with Resolution 112, UN Doc A/Res/112(II) which 
called for the withdrawal of all occupying forces. See also Resolution 293, UN Doc A/Res 
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government of the People’s Republic of China.  
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294 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 468. 
295 Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the One 
Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the 
Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, 
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Korea from 1910 through to 1945 but did not formally renounce it until 1951, 
in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the Treaty, Japan renounced it claims to 
Korea and recognised Korean independence.296 The difficulty was that no 
such entity existed in 1951: it had ceased to exist in 1910, when Japan 
annexed Korea. The Treaty did not make any reference to two Koreas or even 
two governments, making it unclear who Japan renounced sovereignty in 
favour of.  
 
Over time, the differences between the two Koreas became more apparent.297 
Reality forced a change in status. The land border between the two Koreas, 
which had been unofficial along the 38th parallel since 1945, was consolidated 
into a full international boundary.298 The United Nations Command declared a 
maritime border in the West Sea known as the Northern Limit Line,299 but no 
border was declared in the Sea of Japan. Both Koreas were granted UN 
membership in 1991,300 after their applications had been continuously rejected 
since 1949.301  
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B Creation of States 
 
The San Francisco Peace Treaty gave rise to numerous questions regarding 
the status of “Korea” at international law. Japan had renounced its claim to 
“Korea” but no such entity had existed since 1910. From 1945 onwards, 
Korea had been divided but this reality had been ignored in the Treaty. Had 
North Korea seceded from Japan or Korea? Did two governments exist in one 
State or were they two States?302 It is clear that North and South Korea 
became separate States or some point, but the date is unclear. There are a few 
potential dates: 1945 when North and South were first divided; 1948 when 
two separate governments emerged; 1951 when Japan renounced its 
sovereignty claim; 1972 when North Korea achieved more widespread 
recognition; or 1991 when both States became UN members. The preferable 
date is 1948, when North Korea fully satisfied all the indicia of statehood. 
This date is important because North Korea has not actively pursued a claim 
to the Liancourt Rocks since then. 
 
There are five indicia of statehood: the existence of a permanent population; a 
defined territory; a government; the capacity to enter into relations with other 
States;303 and independence.304 There are also other factors that play an 
important role, particularly recognition.305 Permanent population is not in 
issue here, but the other indicia are more controversial and should be 
considered in turn.  
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1 Defined Territory 
 
The first contentious element is defined territory. Statehood implies exclusive 
control over territory.306 In Island of Palmas, Huber said that ‘territorial 
sovereignty…involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a 
State.’307 However a State may exist despite external claims to its territory, 
even claims to its entire territory.308 Territorial boundaries do not need to be 
exactly defined.309 The separation between North and South Korea began in 
1945 as a military solution by the USA and USSR, without any intention to 
create separate States. The division led to the creation of two separate 
governments in 1948, each with exclusive control over their portion. The 
boundaries were delimited in 1953, after the conclusion of the Armistice 
Agreement. North and South Korea both maintain claims to the entire Korean 
peninsula310 but this does not affect their statehood. Therefore North Korea 
could claim to satisfy the indicia of defined territory in 1948 when the DPRK 
assumed control in the north. 
 
2 Government and Capacity to Enter into Relations 
 
The second indicium, government, is tied to territory because territorial 
sovereignty relates to governing power over territory.311 This requirement is 
                                                
306 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 48. See also Shaw, International Law, above n 
21, 199-200. 
307 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 839; Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 46. 
308 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 48-9. See Monastery at St Naoum (Albanian 
Frontier) (Advisory Opinion [1924] PCIJ (ser B) No 9, 8-10, 16 (‘St Naoum’); Polish-
Czechoslovakian Frontier (Question of Jaworzina) (Advisory Opinion) [1923] PCIJ (ser B) 
No 8, 20-1 (‘Jaworzina’).  
309 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274; 49-50; St Naoum [1924] PCIJ (ser B) No 9, 10; 
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark) (Judgment) [1969] 
ICJ Rep 3, 32 (‘North Sea’); Deutsche Continental GasGesselschaft v Polish State (1929) 5 
ILR 11, 14-5; Genocide [1996] ICJ Rep 595, 664 (Judge Kreća). 
310 Article 3 of the ROK Constitution claims the entire territory of the Korean Peninsula, 
while Article 1 of the DPRK Constitution claims to represent the interests of all Koreans. 
However the initial 1948 DPRK Constitution did lay a territorial claim to Seoul as its capital 
instead of Pyongyang: Damien P Horrigan, ‘Territorial Claims by Divided Nations: Applying 
the Irish Experience to Korea’ (2006) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 227, 239-42; 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea (ROK), adopted 12 July 1948, amended 29 October 
1987 art 3; Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), adopted 27 
December 1972, amended 5 September 1998 art 1.  
311 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 56. 
 45 
not stringently enforced,312 as is evidenced by the 1960 Republic of Congo.313 
There are two key considerations: whether a government has the right or title 
to exercise authority and whether they actually exercise it.314 This requires 
that the government be in general control of the area to the exclusion of other 
entities and that there is some degree of maintenance of law and order and the 
establishment of basic institutions.315 The concept of government is also 
strongly tied to the third indicium of capacity,316 which is more a consequence 
of statehood than a requirement for it.317 It essentially requires that a State 
have an organised system of government with the authority to represent and 
legally bind the State in its relations with other States.318 
 
North Korea satisfied the government requirement in 1948 after the DPRK 
was established. This government was initially supported by the USSR, who 
withdrew from North Korea shortly after its establishment. Even the UN 
recognised that the DPRK, not the ROK, controlled the northern peninsula. In 
these early years, the DPRK had little involvement with other States due to 
limited recognition however it acted on behalf of North Korea in 1948 (when 
it unsuccessfully applied for UN membership), in 1950 (when it authorised 
the invasion of South Korea) and in 1953 (when it signed the Armistice 
Agreement). These examples demonstrate that the DPRK also had the 
capacity to enter into relations, at earliest in 1948, and at the latest by 1953. 
 
 
 
                                                
312 Ibid 56-7. 
313 The Republic of Congo became a State in 1960 despite the existence of secessionary 
movements, rival government factions and a lack of independence with the continued 
presence of foreign military. See Ibid; David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self 
Determination (Kluwer Law International, 2002), 64-5.  
314 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 57-9; Raic, above n 313, 65. See also Somalia 
v Woodhouse Drake SA [1993] QB 54, 67-8 (Hobhouse J); Government of the Republic of 
Spain v SS ‘Arantzazu Mendi’ [1939] AC 256, 267 (Lord Russell) (‘Arantzazu Mendi’). 
315 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 59. See also Genocide [1996] ICJ Rep 595, 666 
(Judge Kreća); Somalia v Woodhouse Drake SA [1993] QB 54, 66 (Hobhouse J); Arantzazu 
Mendi [1939] AC 256, [1939] AC 256, 264-5 (Lord Atkin). 
316 It has been described as a conflation between government and independence: Crawford, 
Creation of States, above n 274, 62. 
317 Ibid 61. See also Genocide [1996] ICJ Rep 595, 662 (Judge Kreća). 
318 Raic, above n 313, 74. 
 46 
3 Independence 
 
The final element, independence, is the central criterion of statehood.319 
Huber defined it as ‘[s]overeignty in the relations between States signifies 
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to 
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a 
State.’320 Independence has two parts: first that a State exists as a separate 
entity within reasonably coherent frontiers; and second, that it is not subject to 
the authority of any other State.321 North Korea satisfied the first part in 1948 
for the reasons outlined above.322 The second part is more problematic, due to 
the continuing involvement and claims of the USSR and Japan. 
 
From its creation, North Korea was a Soviet sphere of influence. The USSR 
blocked UN involvement in the North, trained the North Korean leaders and 
helped establish the DPRK. The Soviet bloc recognised the North Korean 
State and lent military aid during the Korean War. States are permitted to 
restrict their independence without compromising their statehood.323  The 
USSR withdrew from North Korea in 1948 and its intervention during the 
Korean War can be seen as military assistance, not a restriction on 
independence. Therefore the DPRK satisfied independence from the USSR in 
1948.  
 
However it is questionable whether the DPRK was independent from Japan in 
1948. Japan technically maintained its claims to Korea until 1951. Despite 
this, the majority of the UN were willing to recognise and admit South Korea 
as a member State in 1948.324 By accepting signing the Terms of Surrender in 
                                                
319 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 62. 
320 Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 838; See also Ibid. 
321 Austro-German [1931] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 41, 57-8 (Judge Anzilotti); Crawford, Creation 
of States, above n 274, 66. 
322 See pp 44-5.  
323 SS “Wimbledon” (UK, France, Italy and Japan v Germany) (Judgment) [1932] PCIJ (ser 
A) No 1, 25; Shaw, International Law, above n 21, 211; Raic, above n 313, 75; Austro-
German [1931] PCIJ (ser A/B) No 41, 77 (Judges Adatci, Kellogg, Baron Rolin-Jaequemyns, 
Hurst, Shücking, van Eysinga and Wang).  
324 Hara, above n 6, 22; Resolution 195, UN Doc A/Res/195(III).  See also Resolution 82, UN 
Doc S/Res/82; Resolution 293, UN Doc A/Res 293(IV); Resolution 376, UN Doc 
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1945, which incorporated the Cairo Declaration, Japan effectively renounced 
its claims to Korea in 1945.325 Therefore in substance North Korea achieved 
independence in 1948. 
 
4 Recognition 
 
Another important factor in determining statehood is recognition, although it 
is controversial.326 There are two main theories: the declaratory theory, that 
statehood is based upon factual circumstances that other States can choose to 
accept or ignore;327 and the constitutive theory, which holds that the rights and 
duties of statehood derive from recognition.328 Neither accurately reflects 
modern practice.329 Membership of organisations like the UN330 is evidence of 
widespread recognition and statehood.331 However although non-recognition 
does make it difficult to operate as a State in international affairs, it does not 
make statehood impossible.332 
 
When the DPRK was established in 1948 it was only recognised by the Soviet 
bloc. Its application for UN membership was not even considered. However 
UN membership involves more than just statehood: it is open to peace-loving 
States willing and able to carry out the obligations contained in the UN 
Charter.333 North Korea received more widespread recognition in 1973 when 
it became a member of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’)334 and was 
                                                                                                                          
A/Res/376(V); ‘The Problem of the Independence of Korea’, above n 282, 292. However 
South Korea’s application was ultimately unsuccessful due to Soviet opposition.  
325 Instrument of Surrender [1]; Potsdam Declaration [8]; Cairo Declaration [3]; See Chee, 
above n 2, 56. 
326 See eg Shaw, International Law, above n 21, 207, 445-6.  
327 Ibid 446-7; Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 4; Montevideo Convention arts 3, 6. 
328 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 4. 
329 Ibid 5; Shaw, International Law, above n 21, 446. 
330 UN Charter art 4  limits UN membership to States. There is a similar provision for the 
World Trade Organisation, although this is open to States or separate customs territories: see 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature 15 
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) art XII (‘Marrakesh 
Agreement’).  
331 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 27.  
332 Ibid 28. 
333 UN Charter art 4.  
334 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 471; Marrakesh Agreement art XII. 
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granted observer status at the UN.335 It was also recognised by Iceland, 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden.336 In 1991, both North and South Korea 
finally became UN members, with widespread recognition. The limited 
recognition throughout the 1940s-80s must be seen in the context of the Cold 
War, where many communist countries were not recognised by Western 
States.337 In this context, recognition cannot be afforded much weight: it was 
withheld for political reasons, not due to considerations of statehood. Limited 
recognition in 1948 did not prevent North Korea from becoming a State, just 
from fully exercising its rights and duties on an international stage. 
 
In conclusion, North Korea satisfied the indicia of statehood in 1948. From 
then on North Korea, as the DPRK was a State at international law. The 
failure to widely recognise this fact was influenced by Cold War politics and a 
hope for Korean reunification. However by the end of the Cold War, changed 
circumstances forced the international community to face reality and 
recognise both Korean States.  
 
C State Succession 
 
North Korea’s relationship to the old Korea and South Korea is governed by a 
complex, controversial and often confusing area of law known as state 
succession and continuity.338 The two are distinct, but related ideas. State 
succession occurs when there is a definitive replacement of one State by 
another.339 It can only occur when a different State comes into existence: if 
the same State continues to exist in a different form, then that is an example of 
continuity. 340  In some circumstances, like when a federal State is 
                                                
335 Crawford, Creation of States, above n 274, 471. 
336 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1A, above n 274, 134 n 17. 
337 A famous example was the People’s Republic of China, which was established in 1949. 
The UK recognised the PRC in 1950 but the US continued to recognise Taiwan instead. The 
PRC did not obtain China’s seat at the UN until 1971 and with this came more widespread 
recognition by the Western bloc.  
338 See O’Connell, State Succession, vol 1, above n 274, 4; Jennings and Watts (eds), 
Oppenheim, vol 1A, above n 274, 210.  
339 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 423. See also O’Connell, State 
Succession, vol 1, above n 274, 3. 
340 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 426-7.  
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dismembered, one State may be a continuation while the others are 
successors.341 Relevant factors to determine these circumstances include a 
State’s own claim to continuity and recognition by other States.342 There are 
two types of succession that may occur in various ways. Total succession 
occurs when one State completely replaces another on a territory, for example 
through merger or dismemberment.343 Partial succession occurs when only 
part of a territory separates through revolt, independence, cession or 
federation.344  
 
Whenever succession occurs questions arise regarding ownership of property, 
archives, debts, rights and treaties. The wave of state successions in the 
aftermath of World War Two led the International Law Commission to 
attempt to codify the law into two treaties: the 1978 Vienna Convention on the 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties and the 1983 Vienna Convention 
on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debt.345 
Both Conventions have been extensively criticised and are not widely 
ratified. 346  Despite this they have been used to resolve disputes. 347 
                                                
341 An example of this is when the USSR dissolved. Russia was accepted as the continuation 
and retained the USSR’s UN seat while the other States were considered successors and had 
to apply for new membership: see Ibid 427. Another example occurred after the partition of 
British India into India and Pakistan, India was considered the continuation while Pakistan 
became a successor State: see O’Connell, State Succession, vol 1, above n 274, 7-8. 
342 Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 427. There is little evidence available to 
judge whether North and South Korea are continuous States of the old Korea or new States. 
As Korea never had UN membership, both North and South Korea were admitted to the UN 
as new States in 1991. Both States claim to be the only legitimate Korean government. 
However in terms of international recognition, it is more likely that South Korea would be 
considered the continuing State while North Korea would be a successor State, given the 
significant ideological change that led to the establishment of North Korea. However this 
distinction makes little difference to the present dispute because the deciding factor is not 
history but modern acts. 
343 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1A, above n 274, 209; O’Connell, State 
Succession, vol 1, above n 274, 4-5. 
344 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1A, above n 274, 209; O’Connell, State 
Succession, vol 1, above n 274, 4-5. 
345 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, opened for signature 23 
August 1978, 1946 UNTS 3 (entered into force 6 November 1996); Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, opened for signature 8 
April 1983, 2 Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in 
Respect of State Property Archives and Debts 1 (not yet in force); Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s 
Principles, above n 8, 424. 
346 The 1978 Convention has only 22 ratifications while the 1983 Convention has not yet 
entered into force: Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 424.  
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Unfortunately, the scope of the Conventions is limited to treaties, properties 
and debt; not territorial disputes. While certain rights and obligations 
associated with the transferred territory are passed between the predecessor 
and successor state,348 the law of state succession is largely silent in respect of 
territory disputes. Therefore it does nothing to assist in resolving North 
Korea’s role in the Liancourt Rocks dispute.  
 
D Application 
 
1 North Korea’s Ability to Access the ICJ 
 
The first step in determining North Korea’s role in the Liancourt Rocks 
dispute is to determine whether they would be able to participate in 
proceedings. North Korea does not have diplomatic relations with Japan and 
would not be invited to participate in any Korean-Japanese talks regarding the 
dispute. Any agreement to send the dispute to an international tribunal would 
be between Japan and South Korea. If the dispute went before an international 
arbitral tribunal, then North Korea would be unlikely to be joined as tribunals 
cannot generally order a third party be joined unless they are a party to the 
arbitration agreement.349 However the ICJ has two potential mechanisms: 
                                                                                                                          
347 Ibid; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 70-2; 
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (Opinion 9) (1992) 92 ILR 203, 
203; Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (Opinion 12) (1993) 96 ILR 
723, 724; Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (Opinion 14) (1993) 96 
ILR 729, 731; Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (Opinion 15) (1993) 
96 ILR 733, 736. 
348 See eg Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 429-31; Jennings and Watts (eds), 
Oppenheim, vol 1A, above n 274, 224. The parties are also free to agree what rights and 
territory will pass with the succession.  
349 Doug Jones (ed), ‘A Guide to International Arbitration’ (Clayton Utz, 2nd ed, 2012) 
<http://www.claytonutz.com/docs/Guide%20to%20IA_2012.pdf> 7-8. Third party 
intervention is not generally provided for in PCA arbitrations: United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement (UNCTAD, 2003) 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf> [5.12]. The ICJ is also unable to 
direct a third party (even an intervener) to become a party to the case without the consent of 
the parties: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
USA)(Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, 431 (‘Military and Paramilitary 
Activities (Jurisdiction)’); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Application 
to Intervene) [1984] ICJ Rep 3, 25 (‘Libya v Malta (Application to Intervene)’); Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras) (Application for Intervention) 
[1990] ICJ Rep 92, 135 (‘El Salvador v Honduras (Application to Intervene)’).  
 51 
intervention and the principle of Monetary Gold. As a UN member, North 
Korea is a party to the ICJ Statute350 and has access to the Court.351  
 
Under Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, a State that considers it has a legal 
interest that may be affected by the decision may request permission to 
intervene.352 The State can also choose not to intervene and just rely on 
Article 59, which limits the binding force of ICJ judgments to the parties.353 
However this does not provide the same level of protection because the 
enforcement of the decision may have an effect on the third party State.354 The 
Court recognises this, hence the doctrines of intervention and Monetary 
Gold.355 
 
The intervening State can rely on the Statute without establishing additional 
jurisdictional title.356 However they do need to establish how their rights and 
interests would be affected by the decision.357 The original parties may object 
to the intervention358 and the decision is at the Court’s discretion.359 When 
granted, intervention is usually limited to specific issues. 360  Of eleven 
                                                
350 Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ Statute’). 
351 UN Charter art 93.  
352 ICJ Statute art 62. See also art 63. 
353 ICJ Statute art 59; Libya v Malta (Application to Intervene) [1984] ICJ Rep 3, 26; Paolo 
Palchetti, ‘Opening the International Court of Justice to Third States: Intervention and 
Beyond’ in J A Frowein and R Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002), vol 6, 139, 139. 
354 Palchetti, above n 353, 140. 
355 Ruth MacKenzie et al, The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2010)  27 n 184; Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy 
v France, UK and USA) (Preliminary Questions) [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 33 (‘Monetary Gold’); 
East Timor [1995] ICJ Rep 90, 101-4; Palchetti, above n 353, 140. 
356 MacKenzie et al, above n 355, 27; El Salvador v Honduras (Application to Intervene) 
[1990] ICJ Rep 92, 135. 
357 Palchetti, above n 353, 145. 
358 MacKenzie et al, above n 355, 28; ICJ Statute art 62(2); International Court of Justice, 
Rules of Court (adopted 14 April 1978) art 84. 
359 ICJ Statute art 62. See also art 63. 
360 See, eg, El Salvador v Honduras (Application to Intervene) [1990] ICJ Rep 92, 128, 137; 
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) (Order 
on Application by Equatorial Guinea for Permission to Intervene) [1999] ICJ Rep 1029, 
1031, 1035 (‘Cameroon v Nigeria (Order on Intervention)’). However a similar formulation 
was unsuccessful in Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v 
Malaysia) (Application for Permission to Intervene) [2001] ICJ Rep 575, 604, 607 (‘Ligitan 
and Sipadan (Application for Intervention’). See also Palchetti, above n 353, 142. 
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applications for intervention,361 the ICJ has only granted limited intervention 
in five instances.362  
 
Intervention poses numerous difficulties for North Korea. First, South Korea 
and Japan would likely object to the intervention, and the application itself 
may be rejected. Second, North Korea would need full intervention as their 
claims relate to the core issue of sovereignty; essentially they would be 
making a claim themselves. Unlimited intervention has never occurred in the 
Court’s history. Third, intervening would mean North Korea accepted the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction, a prospect unlikely to appeal to the North Korean 
government. Finally, North Korea has not strongly pushed its claim to the 
Liancourt Rocks so it is unlikely to be suddenly be interested enough to 
intervene.  
 
The second possibility is the principle of Monetary Gold.363 This principle 
provides that the Court cannot decide upon the rights and obligations of a 
                                                
361 Haya de La Torre (Colombia v Peru) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 71 (‘Haya de La Torre’); 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Application to Intervene) [1981] ICJ 
Rep 3 (‘Tunisia v Libya (Intervention)’); Libya v Malta (Application to Intervene) [1984] ICJ 
Rep 3; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Jurisdiction) [1984] ICJ Rep 392; El Salvador v 
Honduras (Application to Intervene) [1990] ICJ Rep 92; Cameroon v Nigeria (Order on 
Intervention) [1999] ICJ Rep 1029; Request for an Examination of the Situation in 
Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear 
Tests (New Zealand v France) Case (Order of 22 September 1995) [1995] ICJ Rep 288; 
Ligitan and Sipadan (Application for Intervention) [2001] ICJ Rep 575; Territorial and 
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Application for Permission to Intervene) [2011] 
ICJ Rep 348; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (German v Italy) (Order on the 
Application by the Hellenic Republic for Permission to Intervene) [2011] ICJ Rep 494 
(‘Jurisdictional Immunities (Intervention)’); Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan) 
(Order on the Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand) [2013] ICJ Rep 3 (‘Whaling 
(Intervention)’).This list includes both applications and declarations of intervention. 
362 Haya de La Torre [1951] ICJ Rep 71, 77; El Salvador v Honduras (Application to 
Intervene) [1990] ICJ Rep 92, 137; Cameroon v Nigeria (Order on Intervention) [1999] ICJ 
Rep 1029, 1035; Jurisdictional Immunities (Intervention) [2011] ICJ Rep 494, 503; Whaling 
(Intervention) [2013] ICJ Rep 3, 10. 
363 First developed in Monetary Gold [1954] ICJ Rep 19. The case concerned gold that 
Germany had seized from Rome in 1943, which was later claimed by both Albania and Italy. 
Albania had taken control of it through the National Bank of Albania in 1945 but the UK 
claimed it as compensation after the Corfu Channel case. The resulting dispute between Italy, 
UK, France and USA was referred to the ICJ. Albania was not a party to the case. The Court 
held that in order to decide the dispute it was necessary to determine whether Albania’s 
actions in seizing the gold had been lawful. The Court could not do so without Albania’s 
consent to be a party before it: at 32. 
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State which is not party to the case before it.364 It does not apply if the 
decision only impacts another State without deciding on its interests.365 It was 
applied in the case of a sovereignty dispute in East Timor,366 where the Court 
held that to determine whether Australia had failed to respect Portugal’s 
administering power over East Timor by concluding a treaty with Indonesia 
would first require the Court to find that Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor 
was unlawful.367    
 
The problem with Monetary Gold is that it requires one of the parties to raise 
the objection because the Court may only consider what the parties bring 
before it.368 It would be highly unlikely that either South Korea or Japan 
would raise Monetary Gold in North Korea’s favour: doing so would indicate 
that North Korea had a legitimate claim to the Rocks, which both States wish 
to claim for themselves. In that case, North Korea’s only option outside 
intervention would be to rely on Article 59 to limit the scope of the Court’s 
decision.  
 
2 North Korean Claims  
 
The fundamental question is whether North Korea even has a claim to the 
Liancourt Rocks. The answer is that North Korea would be highly unlikely to 
be successful at international law. This is due to two factors, first the date of 
North Korean statehood, and second its geographical boundaries.  
 
South Korea’s early claims rely on acts taken by the Kingdom of Korea 
before 1910. North Korea has equal claim to this history. However, because 
North Korea became a separate State in 1948, they would be unable to lay 
                                                
364 Monetary Gold [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 32; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Jurisdiction) 
[1984] ICJ Rep 392, 431; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) 
(Preliminary Objections) [1992] ICJ Rep 240, 260-1 (‘Phosphate Lands’); Palchetti, above n 
353, 145. 
365 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Jurisdiction) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, 431; Phosphate 
Lands [1992] ICJ Rep 240, 261; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) 
(Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, 25 (‘Libya v Malta’). 
366 East Timor [1995] ICJ Rep 90. 
367 Ibid 105. 
368 ICJ Statute art 36. 
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claim to the more recent actions South Korea has taken to solidify its claims. 
This is where the strength of South Korea’s claim lay. As was established in 
Chapter III, neither Japan nor South Korea would be successful in establishing 
ancient title, and this extends to North Korea too. Since 1948, North Korea 
has been silent in the dispute.369 Therefore it has likely abandoned any claim it 
may have had,370 leaving South Korea to succeed to Korea’s ancient acts in 
combination with their modern control.   
 
The second reason is the boundaries. Technically North and South Korea do 
not have any boundaries in the Sea of Japan near the Liancourt Rocks. In the 
West Sea, the Northern Limit Line delimits the boundaries and this line is 
drawn close to the North Korean coast.371 If a similar line were drawn in the 
east, the Rocks would easily fall in the South Korean zone. Likewise if 
maritime borders were drawn outwards from the 38th parallel, the Liancourt 
Rocks would fall south of the line. Geographically, the Rocks are closest to 
Ulleungdo, which is South Korean territory. For these reasons, it makes little 
sense to grant the Liancourt Rocks to North Korea.   
 
E Conclusion 
 
North Korea is usually forgotten in the Liancourt Rocks dispute, but it is 
worth considering its role. The possibility of Communist control over the 
Rocks was one factor that led the USA to support Japan’s claims over South 
Korea’s. The legal relationship between North, South and old Korea has been 
complicated by history and reluctance to accept a divided Korea. North Korea 
satisfied the requirements for statehood in 1948 and thus emerged onto the 
international stage as a new State. Since then, North Korea has been quiet 
regarding the Liancourt Rocks dispute. They have not taken any actions to 
                                                
369 Some scholars do indicate that North Korea believes that the Liancourt Rocks are Korean 
territory but there are few official statements regarding this. See Kajimura, above n 1, 424, 
429. 
370 See Chapter II, p 11 for law of abandonment.  
371 This maritime boundary has been the subject of ongoing dispute between North and South 
Korea. See, eg: Evan Ramstad, ‘Korea Crisis Has Roots in Border Row’, Wall Street Journal 
(online), 2 Jun2 2010 
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703961204575280472071130754>.  
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protest Japanese claims, support South Korea or establish control over the 
Rocks themselves. Even if North Korea were able to intervene in the dispute, 
they would not be successful due to their inactivity and geographic reality. 
The Liancourt Rocks are closest to South Korea, who have built upon them 
and controlled them since 1952. For these reasons, the Rocks rightfully 
belong to South Korea alone.  
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V UNCLOS 
 
The Liancourt Rocks dispute took on a new dimension with the adoption of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’).372 The 
Convention’s introduction of extended maritime zones increased State control 
over the high seas. As a result, sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks could 
extend well beyond the Rocks373 themselves and cover valuable marine 
resources including fisheries and hydrocarbons.374 The generation of maritime 
zones also affects the maritime boundary delimitation between Japan and 
South Korea. The delimitation of the boundary is closely tied to the question 
of sovereignty but it is important to consider the impact of UNCLOS for two 
reasons. First, it makes the stakes clear: what are they fighting over? Second, 
if the issue is not resolved at the same time as sovereignty is determined then 
it will be a cause for further dispute later as other States seek to minimise the 
impact of the decision.    
 
A Law of the Sea 
1 UNCLOS 
 
UNCLOS was adopted during the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea that ran from 1973 to 1982. It built upon the work of the two 
preceding conferences: the first held in 1956 resulted in four treaties 
concluded in 1958375 and the second held in 1960 without result. Japan and 
South Korea both signed and ratified UNCLOS in 1982, but the Convention 
did not enter into force until 16 November 1994, after Guyana deposited the 
sixtieth ratification. 
                                                
372 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 
1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’).  
373 In fact the Liancourt Rocks could affect 16,600 square nautical miles of waters: Lee, ‘San 
Francisco Peace Treaty’, above n 156, 92; Haas, above n 9 3. 
374 Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 198; Evidence of this is inconclusive. 
See Kanehara, above n 253, 88. 
375 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, opened for signature 29 April 
1958, 516 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 September 1964) (‘GCTS’); Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311 (entered into force 10 
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450 UNTS 11 (entered into force 30 September 1962); Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 559 
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UNCLOS introduced a six-zone system to define what control States had over 
the waters surrounding them. These zones are the: internal seas, territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. A sixth 
zone, an archipelagic sea, is permitted for recognised archipelagic States.376 
The zones are all measured from a baseline, which is normally the coastal low 
water mark.377  
 
All water on the landward side of the baseline forms the first zone, the 
internal seas.378 Internal seas are considered part of the State’s land territory, 
with all the same sovereign rights and jurisdiction associated. The second 
zone is the territorial sea, extending a maximum of 12nm 379  from the 
baseline.380 Within the territorial sea the coastal State has all the rights and 
duties inherent in sovereignty.381 This includes the right to exercise general 
police powers, reserve fisheries for national use and exclude foreign vessels 
from trade,382 subject to the right of innocent passage.383 The third zone, the 
contiguous zone, extends a further 12nm from the territorial sea. This is not 
part of a State’s sovereign territory384 but is subject to its jurisdiction in four 
limited areas. These are: customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary 
                                                
376 UNCLOS arts 46, 49. 
377 Ibid art 5; GCTS art 3; Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1A, above n 274, 602. 
States may also draw their own baselines using alternative methods provided for in UNCLOS 
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383 UNCLOS Art 17; GCTS art 14; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 264-5.  
384 On its own, the contiguous zone forms part of the high seas: UNCLOS arts 55, 86; GCTS 
art 24; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 265. 
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regulations, but only where the infringement has or will occur in the state’s 
territory or territorial sea.385 
 
The fourth zone is the Exclusive Economic Zone (‘EEZ’). This zone is a 
significant extension of State jurisdiction386 and developed from fisheries 
zones.387 It extends to a maximum of 200nm from the territorial sea and 
allows the State to exercise a mix of sovereign and jurisdictional rights. The 
State has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural 
resources of the seabed, subsoil and waters.388 It has jurisdiction to establish 
infrastructure, conduct scientific research and preserve the marine 
environment.389 An EEZ must be proclaimed and does not always extend to 
the full 200nm limit.390 Some States still prefer to claim a fishery zone instead 
of, or in conjunction with, an EEZ.391 Japan traditionally maintained a 200nm 
exclusive fishing zone392 but now claims that the Liancourt Rocks are entitled 
to an EEZ. 
 
The final zone is the continental shelf. This overlaps the EEZ but may extend 
further. It is defined as extending along the natural prolongation of the State’s 
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 
200nm from the coastal baseline, whichever is longer.393 Within this area the 
coastal State can exercise sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and 
exploiting the minerals in the subsoil and living resources physically attached 
                                                
385 UNCLOS art 33; Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles, above n 8, 266; Jennings and 
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to the shelf.394 Everything beyond this zone forms part of the normal high 
seas.395 
 
2 Article 121(3) 
 
Not all maritime features are entitled to these five zones. Islands are generally 
entitled to all five zones396 but this is qualified by Article 121(3) which 
provides that ‘rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life 
of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.’397 
UNCLOS defines an island as ‘a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by 
water, which is above water at high tide.’398 However it does not include a 
definition of “rocks”. The issue was contentious during the drafting of 
UNCLOS due to competing State interests.399 The inclusion of rocks in Article 
121 ‘Regime of Islands’ indicates that rocks satisfy the definition of islands 
but are a disqualified subclass because they are unable to sustain life.400  
 
Four main tests have been proposed for distinguishing between rocks and 
other islands. Two derive from the wording of Article 121(3): human 
habitability and economic life. The other two, size and geology, were raised 
during discussions at the UNCLOS Conference but were not included in the 
final text. 401 The International Hydrographic Bureau has a mathematical 
distinction between small islets (1 to 10 sq km), isles (10 to 100 km) and 
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islands (100 to 5 x 106 sq km).402 These measurements inspired political 
geographers Hodgson and Smith to develop their own formula including a 
fourth classification of rocks.403 Using their measurements, rocks have an area 
of less than .001 square miles, islets are between .001 and 1 sq mile, isles 
between 1 to 1000 sq miles and islands are larger than 1,000 square miles.404 
However size criteria has not attracted much support from States.405 
 
The second proposal was to define rocks on the basis of geology. In its 
ordinary meaning a rock is a ‘hard part of the earth’s crust’.406 Various 
phrases such as  ‘islands’, ‘islets’, ‘small islands’ and ‘rocks’ were suggested 
in the course of drafting Article 121 to distinguish between different 
features.407 No consensus has been reached on whether the final wording 
should be read to include features like sandbanks, 408  although some 
commentators suggest that it should.409 
 
The key tests then are those listed in Article 121(3): human habitation and 
economic life. International tribunals have shed light on the issue. In the 
Volga410 Judge Budislav Vukas of the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (‘ITLOS’) explained that all features that cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own are considered to be rocks for the 
purposes of Article 121.411 The case concerned the application for prompt 
release of a Russian flagged fishing vessel that had been apprehended near the 
Australian islands of Heard and McDonald.412 Although Heard Island is large, 
both islands lack a permanent population and are located in sub Antarctic 
waters.413 Judge Vukas objected to Australian claims to EEZs around these 
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features on the basis that they were rocks for the purposes of Article 121(3).414 
The majority of ITLOS made no comment on the issue.415 Judge Vukas took a 
similar view regarding French EEZ claims around Kerguelen Islands in The 
Monte Confurco Case.416  The Kerguelen Islands are also in sub-Antarctic 
waters and have a small scientific settlement, staffed all year round.417  
 
Judge Vukas’s reasoning was based on the principle of an EEZ. EEZs were 
designed to protect the economic interests of coastal States and communities 
that depended on maritime resources to survive. 418  This protection is 
unnecessary if the feature does not support human habitation.419 Judge Vukas 
recognised that while EEZs were useful to preserve marine resources other 
mechanisms were designed to achieve this.420 Scholars have supported this 
reasoning, with Professor Charney stating that ‘the primary purpose of Article 
121(3) was to ensure that insignificant features, particularly those far from 
other States, could not generate broad zones of national jurisdiction in the 
middle of the ocean.’421 
 
So what is meant by ‘human habitation’ and ‘economic life of their own’ and 
must they both be satisfied? Both tests rely on human activity, and earlier 
versions of Article 121(3) used the word ‘and’ to link ‘human habitation’ to 
‘economic life’.422 However the final text uses the word ‘or’ which supports 
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the proposition that a feature does not need to satisfy both tests.423 The 
requirements to satisfy the test seem to set a low bar. Human habitation does 
not need to be permanent only regular.424 Economic life does not need to be 
capable of supporting humans throughout the year but the mere existence of 
valuable natural resources is not sufficient – the use of the phrase ‘life of its 
own’ indicates that the resource must have an economic value that would 
support its exploitation.425 In a 1999 article, Professor Charney examined the 
texts of UNCLOS in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese and Russian. 
He concluded that ‘Article 121(3) ought to be interpreted to permit the finding 
of an economic life as long as the feature can generate revenues sufficient to 
purchase the missing necessities.’426  
 
The most important decision in respect of Article 121(3) is the 2009 ICJ 
decision of Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine).427 
The case was primarily a maritime delimitation case, but in argument the 
Romanian and Ukrainian agents addressed whether Snake Island was 
classified as an island or a rock. Snake Island has a total landmass of 0.17km 
squared. It has no fresh water, was historically uninhabited, and had only one 
structure, a lighthouse built in the 1800s.428 In recent years however Ukraine 
began developing the islands, building structures and a pier.429 Ukraine argued 
that Snake Island was able to sustain human habitation and economic activity, 
with sufficient water supplies, vegetation and buildings.430 Romania argued 
that it was a rock because it was ‘totally dependent for food, water and every 
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other human need.’431 The Romanian agent also argued that in order to satisfy 
the human habitation requirement, the population must be stable and not 
ordered to go there by employers.432 The ICJ declined to provide a definition 
of ‘rock’ and did not directly respond to these arguments but their decision 
strongly favoured Romania, excluding Snake Island from the boundary 
delimitation.433 
 
State practice has been ambivalent. In 1970, before UNCLOS was adopted, 
Taiwan issued a reservation when ratifying the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf stating that exposed rocks and islets would not be taken into account 
when determining the boundary of their continental shelf. This was in 
apparent reference to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and China reportedly 
shares this opinion. 434  In 1997, before ascending to UNCLOS, the UK 
renounced any claim to a continental shelf or EEZ around Rockall, a barren 
granite feature northwest of Scotland.435 However Japan’s position is that all 
islands and islets can generate maritime zones regardless of their size and 
habitability436 and for this reason continues to maintain that Okinotorishima is 
entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf.437  
 
B Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
 
1 Equitable Delimitation 
 
Whenever claims to maritime zones overlap there is a potential boundary 
delimitation problem.438 This is a major problem because every coastal State 
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in the world has an overlapping maritime zone with another State.439 The 
majority of maritime boundaries have never been formally agreed, with only 
168 of approximately 427 potential maritime boundaries even partially 
agreed.440 In Central East Asia most maritime boundaries are subject to 
disputes.441 Maritime boundary disputes have formed a large part of the ICJ’s 
work. At the time of writing, there are three maritime delimitation cases 
pending before the Court.442  
 
Different mechanisms are used to delimitate the different maritime zones. 
UNCLOS Article 15 provides that where there are overlapping claims to a 
territorial sea the equidistance method is to be used unless the parties agree 
otherwise or there are historic titles or other special circumstances that make it 
inappropriate.443 The ICJ developed a three-step444 method after Qatar and 
Bahrain and the Caribbean Sea, using equidistance. 445  First, the Court 
considers drawing a provisional line of equidistance.446 Second, they consider 
whether that line should be abandoned due to special circumstances.447 Some 
considerations the Court bears in mind are the coastal geography, the 
delimitation of the territorial sea of adjacent States and the physical features 
of the area adjacent to the land boundary.448 Finally, the Court may consider 
their own means of delimitation or adopt those proposed by the parties.449  
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The provisions for continental shelf disputes (Article 83) and EEZ claims 
(Article 74) mirror each other, providing that the parties come to an 
agreement on the basis of international law to achieve an equitable solution.450 
These two provisions do not indicate a preferred method of delimitation.451 
Initially the equidistance method was used for delimitation of continental 
shelves and EEZs. Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf specified using a median line for opposite States452 and an 
equidistance line for adjoining States.453 The ICJ rejected the equidistance 
method as the sole method in North Sea Continental Shelf454 because it would 
result in areas forming a natural part of one State being given to another.455 
Instead the Court held that delimitation was to be effected by agreement in 
accordance with equitable principles and taking account of natural 
prolongation.456 The principle of natural prolongation was prominent in the 
1970s but has not been utilised by tribunals since.457 
 
In a number of cases the ICJ has preferred to use the equidistance or median 
lines as an aid to preliminary analysis before adjusting them to suit the 
circumstances.458 Similar to the delimitation of territorial sea claims, this 
forms the first of a three stage process.459 First, the Court establishes a 
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provisional equidistance line.460 If the equidistance method is inappropriate in 
the particular circumstances then the Court will consider a different method of 
delimitation.461 Next, the Court considers the relevant circumstances.462 These 
circumstances are similar to the special circumstances referred to in Article 6 
of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.463 They include the 
general coastal geography, the disparity of coastline length and equitable 
access to natural resources.464 Finally, the Court will verify that the line is not 
inequitable.465 Specific equitable principles have emerged through the Court’s 
jurisprudence.466 These include the principle of non-encroachment (neither 
party should encroach on natural prolongation of another), 467  that the 
delimitation should not cut off the seaward projection of the coastline,468 and 
that delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with 
international law and the use of practical methods to ensure an equitable 
result.469 There is also a slight presumption that the equitable solution will 
result in an equal division of the areas of overlap.470 Proportionality is not a 
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separate principle of delimitation but it can be used to determine whether the 
result is equitable.471 
 
Although EEZ delimitation is based upon the same principles as continental 
shelves, some differences emerge. These differences relate to balancing the 
equitable factors, particularly when the EEZ is important for fisheries.472 The 
presence of oil and gas are also relevant factors. In Tunisia/Libya the ICJ was 
willing to consider the presence of oil wells in the delimited area.473 However 
this does not mean that the delimitation is influenced by the economic 
positions of the two States.474 
 
2 Effect of Islands 
 
One of the most important circumstances to consider in maritime boundary 
delimitation is the presence and effect of islands. 475  There are four 
possibilities: islands may be given full476 or half effect,477 or they may be 
ignored or enclaved.478 Enclaving is popular where islands exist in the middle 
of the delimited area or on the wrong side of the median line.479 Even islands 
entitled to the full maritime zones are often given diminished effect on 
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maritime delimitation as opposed to the mainland. 480  Tiny islands are 
frequently ignored altogether. Islands are often ignored when they are barren 
or uninhabitable.481 In Qatar and Bahrain the ICJ chose to ignore the small, 
barren and uninhabited islet of Qit’at Jaradah as well as the larger feature of 
Fasht al Jarim which was a low-tide elevation.482 The Court stated that using 
such features as base points on the baseline would ‘distort the boundary and 
have disproportionate affects’ on the delimitation.483   
 
C Application 
1 Liancourt Rock’s Entitlement to Maritime Zones 
 
Both Japan and South Korea (despite previously stating otherwise) 484 
maintain that the Liancourt Rocks are islands entitled to all five maritime 
zones.485 The waters surrounding the Liancourt Rocks include rich fishing 
grounds, particularly the Yamato Deposit.486 The ability to claim an EEZ over 
these waters would give the sovereign State exclusive rights to exploit these 
resources. Both parties currently agree that the Liancourt Rocks are entitled to 
an EEZ so it is possible that the question would not be put before an 
international tribunal. However in all likelihood, after the issue of sovereignty 
was decided, the other State or surrounding States would challenge exclusive 
rights to these resources. As a result it is worth considering whether the 
Liancourt Rocks are legally entitled to these extended maritime zones.  
 
The answer has to be that they are not. The Liancourt Rocks satisfy the test 
outlined in Article 121(1) of UNCLOS for the definition of an island but as 
rocks they fall under the exclusion in Article 121(3). The Rocks are a 
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naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water and above water at high 
tide. However they are small and generally inhospitable. Vegetation is scarce 
and there is no fresh drinking water. This deficiency has been corrected using 
artificial means after the development of a desalination plant but it is not clear 
that artificial additions are sufficient to satisfy the test.487 If it was, then nearly 
any rock could become an island and generate extended maritime zones. A 
contingent of South Korean marine police is stationed on the Rocks to support 
South Korea’s sovereignty claim, along with one family.488 However they 
only generally reside on the Rocks during the summer months.489 Even South 
Korean scholars have acknowledged that the Rocks are unsuitable for general 
human habitation.490  
 
In many ways, the Liancourt Rocks are similar to the many other small 
maritime features that have formed the subject of international disputes. The 
small management staff stationed in the Liancourt Rocks is similar to the 
scientific community that resided on the French Kerguelen Islands. In a 
similar situation to that described by the Romanian agent regarding Snake 
Island, the majority are ordered to go to the Liancourt Rock by employers. 
The majority of scholars who have considered the Liancourt Rock’s 
entitlement to extended maritime zones have concluded that they are rocks for 
the purposes of Article 121(3) and are therefore not entitled to an EEZ or 
continental shelf.491 
 
2 Boundary Delimitation between Japan and South Korea 
 
In 1974 Japan and South Korea entered into two agreements delimiting part of 
the continental shelf boundary and creating a joint development zone in the 
disputed area.492 The continental shelf boundary uses a median line that starts 
                                                
487 See Haas, above n 9, 5. 
488 Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over Islands’, above n 47, 46; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, 
above n 4, 197. 
489 Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over Islands’, above n 47, 46. 
490 See Ibid 51; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, above n 4, 197.  
491 Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over Islands’, above n 47, 51; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, 
above n 4, 202; Schoenbaum, above n 4, 237; Haas, above n 9, 5. 
492 Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over Islands’, above n 47, 53-4. See also Kanehara, above n 253, 78. 
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at the midpoint of Cheju Island (Korean) and Gotto Retto (Japanese).493 It 
then moves north and closer to the Korean coastline due to the impact of the 
Japanese island of Tsuhima which is located in the Korean strait. 494 It 
continues to head north from there, but veers away from the Korean coast. 
The line stops sharply at “Point 35”, the point at which the Liancourt Rocks 
come into play and affect the boundary delimitation.495 
 
Both South Korea and Japan believe that the delimitation line for the EEZs 
should be a median line and both use the Liancourt Rocks as a basepoint on 
that line.496 South Korea initially proposed that the median line should be 
between the Korean island of Ulleungdo and the Japanese island of Oki, based 
on the belief that the Liancourt Rocks were not entitled to generate maritime 
zones.497 However after changing their position on the Rocks’ entitlement, 
South Korea proposed a new median line between the Liancourt Rocks and 
Oki Island.498 Japan however contests that the median line should be between 
the Liancourt Rocks and Ulleungdo.499 
 
The boundary delimitation argument, to a large extent, depends upon the 
sovereignty decision. As outlined in Chapter 3, South Korea has the best 
claim to the Liancourt Rocks and would likely be successful before the ICJ. 
As a result, the Rocks should fall on the Korean side of the boundary. This is 
possible by using two different points: either incorporating the Liancourt 
Rocks as a basepoint and drawing the line between the Rocks and Oki Islands, 
or by excluding it and drawing the line between Ulleungdo and Oki Islands 
(Ulleungdo is entitled to the full maritime zones and the Liancourt Rocks 
would fall within this area). However if Japan were successful in claiming 
sovereignty over the islands, then including the Liancourt Rocks would 
extend their zones into the South Korean zone generated by Ulleungdo, which 
                                                
493 Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over Islands’, above n 47, 54. 
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496 Kanehara, above n 253, 77, 86. 
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would cause significant delimitation problems and result in reduced zones for 
both. If full EEZs were claimed then the zones would overlap considerably 
however the Liancourt Rocks are not entitled to a full EEZ, only to a 
territorial sea and contiguous zone. These zones would extend into the 
territorial sea of Ulleungdo but not Oki Island.500 
 
However as a small maritime feature the Liancourt Rocks should not be taken 
into consideration in the boundary delimitation. Their significance lay in the 
potential for an EEZ; a potential that is unfounded at international law. For 
South Korea they have very little other use; whereas Japan historically used 
them as a stopover point to reach Ulleungdo, South Korea has no such need. 
Given the problems associated with using the Liancourt Rocks as a base point, 
they should be excluded and the maritime boundary would become the 
median line or equidistance line between Ulleungdo and Oki Islands.501 If this 
occurs then the Liancourt Rocks would be located on the South Korean side 
and would not affect the boundary delimitation at all.502 The late Professor 
Van Dyke argues that if a different approach were used and the Liancourt 
Rocks ended up on the Japanese side of the boundary then its maritime zone 
should be enclaved and limited to a 12nm territorial sea.503 
 
D Conclusion 
 
In practical terms the Liancourt Rocks are valuable for the waters surrounding 
them. If the Rocks were able to sustain extended maritime zones, particularly 
an EEZ, then their sovereign would be able to claim exclusive rights to exploit 
valuable marine resources. Both Japan and South Korea maintain that the 
                                                
500 1nm is equivalent to approximately 1.85km. A full territorial sea therefore extends up to 
22.2km while an EEZ could extend up to 370km. The distances between Ulleungdo, the 
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501 Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over Islands’, above n 47, 52; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, 
above n 4, 197-8. 
502 Van Dyke, ‘Disputes over Islands’, above n 47, 52; Van Dyke, ‘Sovereignty over Dokdo’, 
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Rocks are entitled to an EEZ, but these claims are not supported by 
international law. The Rocks cannot sustain a stable population, are largely 
uninhabitable due to sharp cliffs, and basic necessities like water must be 
supplied from outside. For these reasons, the Rocks fall under the exclusion 
contained in Article 121(3). As a result, the Rocks should not be taken into 
account in boundary delimitation. The maritime boundary line between South 
Korea and Japan should fall between Ulleungdo and Oki Islands. Given that 
Ulleungdo is entitled to the full maritime zones, the Liancourt Rocks would 
fall on the South Korean side, consistent with their sovereignty.  
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VI CONDOMINIUMS 
 
There is a potential middle ground solution to the Liancourt Rocks dispute 
whereby both Japan and South Korea would be able to retain use of the Rocks 
and surrounding marine resources. This solution is a condominium, which 
would render the area subject to joint sovereignty and control. However while 
this could be a practical approach, it would not resolve the underlying issue: 
national pride. 
 
A Condominiums 
1 Historical Use 
 
Sovereignty is traditionally regarded as an exclusive and indivisible right of a 
single State.504 However there are exceptions, the main one being that of a 
condominium.505 There is no universally agreed definition of a condominium 
and most scholars focus on different aspects of it, either sovereignty, territory, 
or control.506 A condominium generally exists when two or more States 
exercise joint sovereignty over a territory.507 Sovereignty is not exclusively 
vested in either State alone, or halved between them but entirely vested in 
them as a joint entity.  
 
Condominiums have been a feature of international law for centuries. They 
were traditionally used as temporary measures to resolve territorial disputes 
after negotiation failed. Despite this, condominiums have been widely ignored 
in international scholarship.508 Critics claim that if States are unable to resolve 
disputes peacefully then they will never be able to work cooperatively in a 
condominium arrangement. 509  Historical condominiums are frequently 
                                                
504 See Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim, vol 1B, above n 7, 565. 
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regarded as failures that resulted in unstable governance. However 
condominiums were frequently used and often long lasting. 
 
The earliest condominium was created in the thirteenth century BC between 
Egypt and Hatti.510 After a brutal war, the Egyptian and Hattian Kings agreed 
to a treaty to end their hostilities in Asia Minor.511 They renounced all planned 
conquests, pledged mutual assistance in case of third party attacks and agreed 
to cooperate in governing their Syrian subjects.512 This joint cooperation over 
Syria was an early example of condominium.513 Later, condominiums were 
influenced by Roman civil law, in particular the doctrine of communion pro 
indivisio which translates to undivided joint property.514  
 
Condominiums were used extensively during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as a quick solution to maintain the balance of power and resolve 
colonial disputes. The most famous example is the New Hebrides. This was a 
colonial condominium to govern a chain of islands in the Pacific Ocean of 
interest to both France and Britain.515 In 1906 Britain and France agreed to a 
condominium that lasted seventy-four years.516 It was based on strict equality 
over the territory. The terms were essentially this: each power was responsible 
for its own expenses but a unified condominium fund, drawn equally from 
both States, would be used to cover joint expenses.517 Executive command 
rested with two High Commissioners, one British and one French, who acted 
in unison on all major decisions.518 All administrative departments were 
staffed by officers of both nations and the police were divided into two 
separate forces of armed natives, one reporting to the British and the other to 
                                                
510 Ibid 732. 
511 Ibid 732-3. 
512 Ibid 733. 
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid. See also Bantz, above n 506, 79-81. 
515 Samuels, above n 507, 737. The British Government was particularly influenced by 
Australia, as many Australian settlers were involved in trade in the New Hebrides. See D P 
O’Connell, ‘The Condominium of the New Hebrides’ (1969) 43 British Yearbook of 
International Law 71, 73-4.  
516 Samuels, above n 507, 737.  
517 Ibid 738. 
518 Ibid 738-40. 
 75 
the French.519 Both States retained sovereignty over their nationals but the 
indigenous population fell into a legal vacuum.520 The condominium territory 
had its own judicial system, with a Joint Court for condominium matters and 
separate British and French Courts.521 In its early years, the condominium was 
unsuccessful despite numerous agreements between Britain and France to 
enhance its administration.522 By 1939, the New Hebrides were neglected and 
backward.523 Circumstances did improve after 1954524 and the condominium 
only ended in 1980 when the New Hebrides became the independent State of 
Vanuatu.525  
 
The Moresnet Condominium is proof that two disputing States can 
successfully operate a condominium. The dispute revolved around the District 
of Moresnet, which was claimed by both Prussia and the Netherlands. Unable 
to agree on who was the rightful sovereign, the parties created to a 
condominium which lasted from 1816 to 1919.526 The village of Moresnet 
became Dutch territory, Neu-Moresnet became Prussian and the zinc mine 
and surrounding village of Kelmis became subject to a condominium.527 The 
condominium even survived a change of party in 1830 when Belgium 
achieved independence from the Netherlands and took control of the Dutch 
side.528 The Agreement of Aachen set down the governing rules. The French 
Code of the First Empire, which was the existing law in Moresnet, remained 
in force and could only be amended by the agreement of both governments.529 
Legislative and executive powers were exercised in common530  and the 
territory was initially governed by two royal commissioners, representing 
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each sovereign.531 The two commissioners appointed the Mayor, who acted as 
Head of State.532 Residents were joint citizens and could choose their country 
of allegiance to determine what laws applied to them.533 Services were shared 
between the two States and the condominium brought many economic 
benefits including lowers taxes and prices for goods.534 The condominium 
effectively ended during World War One when Germany 535  annexed 
Moresnet and invaded Belgium.536 In 1919 the Treaty of Versailles passed 
Moresnet to Belgium and it has remained under Belgian control since.537 
 
Condominium type arrangements can even continue after the formal 
condominium has been dissolved, as is the case in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 
Neutral Zone. A condominium was established by the Uqair Convention in 
December 1922.538 The convention provided that the two countries would 
share equal rights over the territory until definitive frontiers could be agreed 
on.539 The arrangement ended in 1965 when the countries partitioned the 
Neutral Zone into two sections, one belonging to Kuwait and the other to 
Saudi Arabia.540 However the Convention also provided that the parties would 
continue to share equal rights in the whole zone in order to enable the 
exploration of natural resources.541 
 
States may also exercise joint jurisdiction without asserting sovereignty.542 
Some examples of this include military occupations and mandated or trust 
territories.543 Another example for use of resources is the Antarctic system. 
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Numerous States have asserted sovereignty of different parts of Antarctica.544 
Those claims were suspended (but not renounced) by the Antarctic Treaty.545 
This Treaty established an international organisation to provide common 
standards for the use of Antarctica.546 Those States active in Antarctica have 
voting rights. 547  Administration of individuals and scientific bases in 
Antarctica is carried out by each individual State, in line with those common 
standards.548 Morrison refers to this arrangement as a ‘kind of non-sovereign 
condominium of the members of the organization.’549 
 
In respect of marine resources, the International Seabed Authority 550  is 
another modern example. The high seas are the property of all mankind, and 
no State can hold sovereignty over them.551 However States do have interests 
in exploiting the mineral resources of the deep seabed. The International 
Seabed Authority, therefore, is vested with a type of collective sovereignty, on 
behalf of mankind, over the seabed. It delegates to institutions (representatives 
of the State parties) the right to allocate exploration rights and regulate seabed 
use.552 This collective action is not an exercise of sovereignty but of collective 
control and use of common property.553  
 
2 The Gulf of Fonseca 
 
One of the most important precedents for condominiums is the ICJ decision in 
El Salvador/Honduras regarding the Gulf of Fonseca. This decision 
established that condominiums can be created by circumstances and judicial 
decision, not only by agreement. The Gulf of Fonseca is located off the 
Pacific coast of Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The three States were 
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each successors of the Spanish Empire in South America. The Gulf was the 
subject of a 1917 dispute between El Salvador and Nicaragua before the 
Central American Court of Justice regarding the leasing of a naval base to the 
USA.554 The Court found that the Gulf was a historic bay subject to a 
condominium between Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.555 By 1986 
another dispute had arisen between Honduras, who had not been party to the 
1917 case, and El Salvador over the Court’s conclusion.556 There were 
effectively three aspects to the dispute before the ICJ regarding land 
boundaries, the legal situation of islands and maritime spaces within and 
outside the Gulf.557 Only the third aspect, that of maritime spaces, is relevant 
to condominium.558  
 
The ICJ defined a condominium as ‘a structured system for the joint exercise 
of sovereignty between governmental powers over a territory.’559 The Court 
also noted that it was generally created by agreement between States, but 
accepted that it could be created as a legal consequence of state succession, as 
had been the case in the Gulf of Fonseca.560 The ICJ based its decision upon 
the 1917 case, the historic character of the waters, the absence of claims of 
other States and consistent claims of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.561 
On this basis, the Court upheld the 1917 decision, concluding that the waters 
of the Gulf, beyond the 3 mile territorial sea of each State, were subject to 
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joint sovereignty between El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.562 However 
the Court left open the final determination of the waters, stating this was for 
the parties to agree.563 At present, the Gulf is still held in condominium.  
 
Although the Court’s decision related specifically to maritime spaces, which 
are subject to the laws of the sea addressed in the previous chapter, there is no 
reason why the same principles of condominium cannot be applied to land 
territory.  
  
B A Middle Ground: Condominium over the Liancourt Rocks 
 
Like most sovereignty disputes, the Liancourt Rocks dispute has focused on 
which State holds sovereignty over the Rocks. This traditional approach 
means one party wins everything while the other loses completely. A 
condominium presents an opportunity to find a middle ground, where both 
parties can benefit from the resources surrounding the Rocks. This dispute 
does not involve too many complicating factors. There are only two parties, 
the Rocks are reasonably close to both States and there are no citizenship 
concerns because the Rocks cannot sustain a permanent population. On a 
practical level the dispute is about the use of resources. As the Rocks 
themselves are not resource rich, the focus turns to the surrounding seas.  
 
As explained in Chapter V, the maritime zones around the Liancourt Rocks 
are an important aspect of the dispute. These zones extend over rich fishing 
grounds, including the Yamato Deposit. Japan and South Korea have already 
achieved agreement on provisional delimitations of these zones. These 
agreements, in combination with agreements on fisheries, provide for 
cooperation to utilise the natural resources in the area. These agreement also 
provide a strong basis to begin a condominium over the Liancourt Rocks.  
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In 1965, Japan and South Korea concluded the Basic Treaty, normalising their 
relations after the events of the Second World War. The preamble declared 
that the two States have a ‘mutual desire for good neighbourliness and 
for…mutual respect for sovereignty’ and recognise ‘the importance of close 
cooperation…to the promotion of their mutual welfare and common 
interests.’ 564  Building upon this, the two States concluded a Fisheries 
Agreement in 1965 regulated shared use of marine resources. The preamble 
reflected a desire to cooperate for the development of fisheries, to eliminate 
disputes and achieve maximum sustained productivity in waters of common 
interest to both States.565 
 
In 1998 the parties concluded a new Fisheries Agreement (‘1998 Fisheries 
Agreement’)566 to regulate fishery zones, yields, licenses, scientific research 
and conservation.567  This agreement did not provide a final delimitation of 
EEZs, but instead used provisional fishing zones and limited EEZ fishing 
zones as EEZs.568 It serves as a provisional arrangement as called for in 
Article 74(3) UNCLOS.569 It introduced two provisional zones in disputed 
areas, one in the East China Sea and one in the Sea of Japan (near the 
Liancourt Rocks), where both States could fish.570 The zones were set widely 
to ensure that the Yamato Deposit did not fall entirely within the Japanese 
EEZ.571 The agreement resulted in reduced Korean fishing in Japanese waters 
but allowed South Korea to retain access to the Yamato Deposit.572  
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Another important aspect of the 1998 Fisheries Agreement is the 
establishment of the Joint Japan-Korea Fisheries Commission. 573  The 
Commission is composed of one commissioner and one representative 
appointed by each State, with the power to establish a subsidiary body of 
experts.574 The Commission meets annually, in alternate venues,575 and can 
meet for special sessions with permission from both States.576 It is vested with 
the power to consult, deliberate and recommend on: conditions of fishing;577 
maintenance of order in operations;578 status of marine living resources;579 
cooperation between the parties in the fishing areas;580 conservation and 
management of marine living resources;581 and, broadly, any other matter 
concerning the implementation of the Agreement.582 The Commission can 
only make decisions with the consent of both representatives and these 
decisions are binding on the two States.583 However in the disputed zone 
around the Liancourt Rocks, the Commission only has the power to make 
recommendations, not decisions, regarding conservation and management of 
living marine resources.584 This distinction is critical for South Korea to avoid 
the appearance of taking joint measures over the Rocks with Japan.585 
 
The 1998 Fisheries Agreement contains many aspects of condominium 
administration, without the core aspect of sovereignty. It provides for areas of 
joint control, in which both States are equal and unable to exclude the other. 
In these areas, the States have set rights to resources. Both States retain 
sovereignty over their nationals, and are required to ensure their own nationals 
comply with international law and the Agreement itself.586 The Commission 
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has broad reaching powers in relation to fisheries. Like many condominium 
administrations, it is composed of representatives of both States, can only act 
on the consent of those representatives, and has the power to bind both States. 
 
So what basis would the 1998 Fisheries Agreement serve for a condominium? 
First, it would need to be decided whether such an arrangement would be a 
full condominium (with corresponding sovereign rights) or simply a joint-
administration arrangement (like those for resource exploration). The latter 
would not resolve the sovereignty dispute, but would allow both States to 
retain benefits until the dispute could be resolved. The former would require 
both States to set aside their sovereignty claims and accept joint sovereignty 
over the Liancourt Rocks.  As a long-term solution, this is the better option, 
however it would require extensive planning and would need to be treated as a 
permanent, not temporary, arrangement.587  
 
Under such a scheme, the Liancourt Rocks would be subject to joint 
sovereignty. Effectively the Rocks would become a station for exploration 
and use of the surrounding areas. Sovereignty would extend beyond the Rocks 
into the surrounding seas, into a territorial sea and contiguous zone.588 These 
rights would be governed by UNCLOS, but vested jointly in Japan and South 
Korea. For this arrangement to work, the parties would need to agree on the 
delimitation lines between Ulleungdo and Oki Islands, with a joint zone 
surrounding the Liancourt Rocks.  
 
From there, the focus would turn to resources. The 1998 Fisheries Agreement 
provides a strong foundation for shared resource use in the disputed waters. 
This agreement would have to be re-negotiated with the view towards the 
entire area being subject to joint-sovereignty, rather than dividing parts into 
Japanese and South Korean zones. However a condominium arrangement 
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would require more extensive coverage than just fisheries. Although there is 
no concrete evidence, there have been suggestions of rich hydrocarbons in the 
seabed surrounding the Rocks.589 The parties would need to agree on a 
mechanism to allow joint exploration and exploitation of these resources, or to 
share profits from third party exploration. The Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral 
Zone and Antarctic areas are good precedents for how such an arrangement 
could work. The Parties would also need to formalise agreements on 
navigation rights and scientific research in the zones. 
 
Developing the Joint Japan-Korea Fisheries Commission into an effective 
condominium administration is critical. The Commission has extensive 
powers to control fisheries, but these powers would need to be developed for a 
long-term condominium to work. First, its scope would need to be increased 
to cover all aspects of condominium authority. Second, a stronger dispute 
resolution mechanism would need to be developed. The 1998 Fisheries 
Agreement provides for arbitration, but only on the basis of party consent.590 
For joint governance to work successfully for an extended period of time, 
there must be a mechanism to ensure disagreement are resolved promptly. A 
compulsory arbitration clause, like that in the 1965 Fisheries Agreement,591 
would be more appropriate. However because resource exploration would 
involve nationals of both States and potentially third party States, a 
condominium court or tribunal could be established to decide upon disputes 
related to the condominium territory. To ensure respect for its authority, its 
governing law and rules would need to be mutually agreed by the parties as its 
decisions would be binding on both. A similar system was used in the New 
Hebrides, but was complicated by the fact that the New Hebrides support a 
permanent population. The Liancourt Rocks Court’s jurisdiction would be 
more limited, as disputes would likely focus on private and public 
international law.  
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591 Ibid; 1965 Fisheries Agreement art IX. 
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The main hurdle to establishing a condominium is party consent. Although 
Japan stands to gain from the arrangement, there is little incentive for South 
Korea who already controls the Rocks. However although South Korea 
controls the Rocks themselves, both States have an active presence in the 
surrounding waters. This arrangement would allow South Korea to secure 
more rights in these areas, just as the 1998 Fisheries Agreement did for 
fishing rights.  
 
C Would it Resolve the Problem? 
 
On a practical level there is no reason why a condominium could not resolve 
many of the problems between Japan and South Korea. The Liancourt Rocks 
are not of significant benefit as territory because they are unsuitable for 
human habitation. What is useful are the surrounding seas and marine 
resources. Japan and South Korea already cooperate for the exploitation of the 
major resource – fisheries – and this could be expanded to encompass 
hydrocarbon exploration and governance of the Liancourt Rocks as a station 
for commerce, research and exploration. However a condominium does not 
resolve the issues underlying the sovereignty dispute: the historical context. 
 
The Liancourt Rocks dispute is about more than territorial acquisition and 
marine resources. The importance of sovereignty over the Rocks stems not 
from international law but from history. For South Korea this dispute is about 
nationhood and the legacy of World War Two. South Korea sees Japan’s 1905 
incorporation of the Rocks as the first step to annexing all of Korea.592 Subject 
to strict Japanese influence, Korea was unable to protest and just five years 
later became the first victim of Japanese expansionism. Despite appeals to 
Western countries, Korea was ignored and Japan supported. For the next 
forty-five years, Korea was subject to harsh Japanese rule. The end of the war 
brought freedom from the Japanese but left Korea occupied and divided. 
American occupation policy, driven by the desire to use Japan as a bulwark 
against communism, meant that Japanese interests were prioritised over 
                                                
592 Lee and Lee, above n 190, 3. 
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Korea’s. As a result, Japan did not have to fully account for its actions.593 
Ongoing disputes over the text of Japanese history books and Japanese 
official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine are testament to South Korea’s feelings 
that Japan have not accepted their crimes and made amends.594   
 
This wartime legacy underlies the regional tensions. Although Japan and 
South Korea normalised their diplomatic relations in 1965 and have taken 
great steps forward, they have never truly dealt with their past. Japan’s 
insistence that the Liancourt Rocks are Japanese territory, and reliance on the 
1905 incorporation, are seen as an insult to South Korean sovereignty. Japan 
recognised Korean independence in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but by 
refusing to relinquish their claims to the Liancourt Rocks, they continue to 
deny South Korean sovereignty. Until these problems are resolved, the 
Liancourt Rocks dispute will never be over. South Korea can set aside its 
emotion to cooperate on specific issues but it is unlikely that it will renounce 
sovereignty in favour of a condominium. Doing so would simply bury history 
again.  
 
That’s not to say that a condominium would not have benefits. The process of 
reaching an agreement and working cooperatively may help both States see 
what is truly in issue over the Liancourt Rocks, and attain economic benefits 
from the region. However it could only ever be a temporary fix. Likewise a 
judicial decision forcing Japan to renounce its sovereignty claims over the 
Rocks would not satisfy South Korea’s desire for atonement. Only Japan’s 
                                                
593 Harry N Scheiber, ‘Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality: Perspectives from Law and 
History on War Guilt in Relation to the Dokdo Island Controversy’ in Seokwoo Lee and Hee 
Eun Lee, Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2011) 13, 23. 
594 See, eg, ‘Joint Statement by DPRK and ROK Historians Accusing Japan of Trying to 
Whitewash its History of Aggression’ (2 March 2001) and ‘Comment by Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Makiko Tanaka on the Official Stance Conveyed by the Government of the Republic 
of Korea on the Decision to Authorize Japanese History Textbooks’ (8 May 2001) archived at 
Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (University of Tokyo) <http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/indices/JPKR/index-ENG.html>; ‘Japanese 
Parliamentarians Visit War Shrine Condemned by China and Korea’, The Telegraph (online), 
17 October 2014 <	  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/11168589/Japanese-parliamentarians-
visit-war-shrine-condemned-by-China-and-Korea.html>. 
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acceptance of its past and voluntarily renunciation of its claims to the 
Liancourt Rocks present hope for that.  
 87 
VII CONCLUSION 
 
Historically, both Japan and South Korea have ties to the Liancourt Rocks. 
During the course of history each State has had primary control of the Rocks 
at various points. However while Japan’s claim has been tainted by its actions 
during World War Two, Korea’s has remained strong. Since South Korea 
emerged as a State after the end of the war, it has worked to build upon the 
Rocks and solidify Korea’s ancient claims as its own. Today the Liancourt 
Rocks are undoubtedly controlled by South Korea. For these reasons, South 
Korea will likely prevail as the rightful sovereign over the Liancourt Rocks 
before any international tribunal. 
 
For South Korea, proper recognition of their sovereignty over the Rocks is 
recognition, by the world and by Japan, of their nationhood and how it was 
stripped from them in 1910. This motivation drives them to relentlessly insist 
on their sovereignty, even to the point of rejecting judicial settlement. 
Enforced recognition by an international court or tribunal like the ICJ will not 
achieve South Korea’s aims. Although it is international recognition of their 
claim, it is not recognition by Japan. And it is Japan’s recognition that is 
critical to resolving the dispute. 
 
Beyond these emotional goals there is little to be gained from sovereignty 
over the Liancourt Rocks. The Rocks themselves are essentially useless: they 
do not supply food, water or shelter. Although there are rich resources in the 
surrounding seas, these are not attached to the Rocks. The fact that the Rocks 
cannot sustain life is the exact reason they are not entitled to extensive 
maritime zones under UNCLOS. Fishery rights in the seas surrounding the 
Rocks would be limited to the 12nm territorial sea, and would not extend into 
an EEZ. Due to the Liancourt Rock’s location and the likely maritime 
boundary delimitation, these rights would have to be claimed using Ulleungdo 
and the Oki Islands.  
 
On a practical level, the provisional fishery agreements already provide a 
strong basis for sharing the resources of the Sea of Japan. These agreements 
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allow both countries to benefit economically and encourage cooperation in a 
region historically marred by tension. If the Liancourt Rocks dispute were to 
be resolved practically, then the best option would be to extend this agreement 
into other areas including hydrocarbon exploration and marine scientific 
research. This would encourage further cooperation between the parties and 
ensure continued mutual benefits.  
 
However this arrangement, while suitable in practice, would not resolve the 
underlying problems. To end the ongoing tension in the region both parties 
need to come to terms with their past. For Japan, there is little to be gained 
from attaining sovereignty over the Rocks but much to be gained from 
renouncing it. In renouncing their claims over the Liancourt Rock, Japan 
could re-affirm their 1951 recognition of Korean sovereignty and provide a 
symbolic, but powerful act, of making amends with their past. In doing so, 
Japan would pave the way for both countries to build upon their strong 
economic relationship and retain mutual advantages in the currently disputed 
region.  
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